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1 Resource Reallocation and Business Cycles
Ever since the foundation of real business cycle theory in Kydland and Prescott
(1982), the empirical regularities seen in productivity dynamics over business cycles
have attracted a great amount of research attention. In recent years with longitudinal
micro business data bases becoming more available, our understanding of aggregate
productivity as well as its measurements have much improved.1 We now know that
the representative firm paradigm does not hold in the real world. As a matter of
fact, economies across time and regions are characterized by a large and pervasive
restructuring process due to entry, exit, expansion and contraction of businesses.2
This gives the economy great flexibility and potentially allows economic resources to
be used where they will be most productive. Businesses that use outdated technolo-
gies, or produce products flagging in popularity, experience employment decreases.
And the displaced workers can then be re-employed by entrants or businesses that
are expanding. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) document that, in the U.S., roughly
thirty percent of productivity growth over a ten-year horizon is accounted for by more
productive entering businesses displacing less productive exiting ones.
A body of literature has arisen attempting to empirically synthesize the micro-
economic and macroeconomic patterns of reallocation.3 Much of them have centered
on the creation and destruction of jobs, defined by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
(1996) (hereafter DHS) as gross job flows. A key stylized fact in this literature is
that job reallocation exceeds that necessary to implement observed net job growth.
1The most heavily examined one is the Longitudinal Research Data (LRD) provided by U.S.
Census of Bureau.
2Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report that in most western economies roughly 1 in 10 jobs is
created and 1 in 10 jobs is destroyed every year.
3Due to data limitations, most of the evidence comes from the manufacturing sectors.
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This implies that jobs are continually being reallocated across businesses within the
same industry. DHS document that this is true even when looking at very narrowly
defined industries (four-digit) within specific geographic regions.4 Hence, the large
and pervasive job flows seem to reflect businesses’ idiosyncratic characteristics and
the resulting heterogeneity in their individual labor demand.
This dissertation is an attempt at providing a theoretical framework with hetero-
geneous businesses that relates resource reallocation to productivity dynamics over
business cycles. I combine two driving forces for job flows — learning and creative de-
struction. There has been a long tradition in the profession of examining each force
separately. The idea of creative destruction traces back to Schumpeter (1942), and
has been formalized into a class of vintage models by Caballero and Hammour (1994
and 1996) and Campbell (1997).5 Firm learning, originated by Jovanovic (1982), can
be seen in Ericson and Pakes (1995) and more recently in Moscarini (2003) and Pries
(2004).
Both theories on their own can match some of empirical evidence, but not all.
The vintage models of creative destruction assume that new technology can only be
adopted by constructing new businesses, so that technologically sophisticated busi-
nesses enter to displace older, out-moded ones. This is supported by the fact, as
documented by DHS, that entry and exit of businesses account for a large fraction of
job reallocation. However, while holding some appeal, this prediction runs counter to
4Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) document that, employment shifts among the approximately
450 four-digit industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector account for a mere 13% of excess job
reallocation. Simultaneously cutting the U.S. manufacturing data by state and two-digit industry,
region, size class, age class and ownership type, between-sector shifts account for only 39 percent of
excess job reallocation. The same finding holds up in studies for other countries(e.g. Nocke 1994).
5Another important paper that formalizes Schumpeterian idea is Aghion and Hawitt (1992).
They develop a theoretical model in which endogneous innovations drive creative destruction and
growth.
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the prevalent findings that failure rates decrease sharply with business age (Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson 1989), and that productivity rises with business age (Aw,
Chen and Roberts 1997, Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh 2000). The learning models
formalize the idea that businesses learn over time about initial conditions relevant
to success and business survival. As learning diminishes with age, its contribution
to job flows among businesses in the same birth cohort decreases. While providing
an appealing interpretation of the strong and pervasive negative relationship between
employer age and the magnitude of gross job flows, the learning models fail to ex-
plain the large gross job flows among mature businesses. Moreover, neither learning
nor creative destruction alone can link business age with relative volatility of job de-
struction to creation, while these two have displayed a positive relationship in U.S.
Manufacturing.6
In Chapter Two, I show that the empirical findings above can be potentially
reconciled by a model that combines learning with creative destruction. I focus on
two salient facts of gross job flows: the first is that young plants display greater
turnover rates than old plants; the second is that, although job destruction is more
volatile than job creation in general, this asymmetry is weaker for younger plants.
I then present a framework where two forces interact together to drive micro-level
job flows: creative destruction reallocates labor into technologically more advanced
production units; while learning leads labor to production units with good businesses.
With demand fluctuations, learning generates relative symmetric responses of creation
and destruction, while the creative destruction force makes job destruction more
responsive. Since old businesses are surer about their true idiosyncratic productivity,
6DHS document that in U.S. Manufacturing, creation and destruction are almost equally volatile
for young businesses while old businesses features more volatile destruction.
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the learning force weakens with age. Hence, Chapter Two interprets the observed
cyclical pattern of job flows as the dominance of learning for young businesses and
the dominance of creative destruction for old ones. I use the model to assess job-
flow magnitude over a business’s life cycle analytically and calibrate the model to
match the data quantitatively. Calibration results show that my model does well
in matching young businesses’ higher job-flow magnitude as well as their relative
symmetric volatility of job creation and destruction. However, it cannot fully account
for the magnitude of job flows among mature businesses because of my assumption
of a simplified all-or-nothing form of learning.
Chapter Three takes a further step to relate cyclical resource reallocation to cycli-
cal productivity dynamics. It explores how recessions aﬀect the allocative eﬃciency of
resources and hence the average productivity. The conventional cleansing view argues
that recessions promote more eﬃcient resource allocation by driving out less produc-
tive units and freeing up resources for better uses. Using Chapter Two’s framework of
learning and creative destruction, I posit that recessions create an additional “scar-
ring” eﬀect by reducing the learning opportunities of “potentially good firms.” I show
that as a recession arrives and persists, the reduced profitability truncates the process
of learning, limits the realization of truly good firms, and thus pulls down average
labor productivity. Calibrating my model using data on job flows from U.S. manu-
facturing sector, I find that the scarring eﬀect is likely to dominate the conventional
cleansing eﬀect, and can account for the observed procyclical average productivity.
To be consistent with the evidence provided by DHS, in Chapter Two I call the
basic production unit underlying gross job flows “a plant”, which refers to a physical
location where production takes place. DHS argue that the plant represents the finest
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level of disaggregation available in the Longitudinal Research Data for calculating job
creation and destruction statistics. To fit into the literature of industry organization,
in Chapter Three a production unit is called “a firm”. Chapter Three also features a
simpler version of the model by assuming each firm employs only one worker, so that
a job is created when a firm enters and a job is destroyed when a firm exits. Under
this set-up, learning does not drive job creation but still does promote productivity
growth. Since Chapter Three focuses on productivity dynamics, this simplification
does not aﬀect my main results.
Diﬀerent theories of job flows have existed in the literature. One branch of theories
emphasize the matching of employees and employers (see Mortensen and Pissarides
1994). In their analysis, job destruction is more volatile than job creation because,
although job destruction takes place instantaneously, job creation can not due to the
time-consuming matching process. Another branch focuses on nonconvex adjustment
costs (see Caballero 1992, Campbell and Fisher 2000). In their environment, the
cross-sectional distribution of production units, in terms of where they stand relative
to their adjustment thresholds, may yield asymmetries in the cyclical dynamics of job
creation and destruction. Foote (1997) gives another interesting story regarding the
relative volatility of job creation and destruction. He connects (S, s) idiosyncratic
productivity adjustments with trend employment growth and predicts that a growing
industry features a more responsive creation margin while a declining industry a more
responsive destruction margin. Nevertheless, none of these theories have incorporated
the observed strong and persistent relationship between business age and job-flow
patterns. My theory in Chapter Two builds on this relationship. Campbell and
Fisher (2004) also links business age with job-flow volatility by modeling substitution
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between structured and unstructured jobs over a plant life cycle. While it is diﬃcult
to define structured and unstructured jobs empirically, their work does not feature the
observed pro-cyclical entry rate and counter-cyclical exit rate. Chapter Two shows
that these patterns are present in the cyclical response of my model.
Chapter Three posits that, with a scarring eﬀect pulling down productivity by
limiting businesses’ learning opportunities, the observed intense reallocation during
recessions may contribute to the procyclical behavior of productivity. Barlevy (2002)
proposes a diﬀerent story. He argues that during recessions, workers are more likely
to stuck in mediocre matches with reduced worker flows, so that fewer high quality
matches are created. Besides resource reallocation, the literature have provided other
explanations for the cyclical behavior of productivity including cyclical technological
shocks, increasing returns to scale, and factor utilization. Basu (1996) empirically
investigate their merits using a panel on US manufacturing inputs and outputs from
1953 to 1984, and highlights the relative importance of factor utilization. But with
industry-level data, he cannot assess the contribution of cross-business resource re-
allocation. Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) provide a more disaggregated
empirical exploration. They find productivity to be more procyclical at the plant
level than at the industry level, and posit that short-run reallocation yields a coun-
tercyclical contribution to productivity. However, as I elaborate in Chapter Three,
the cleansing eﬀect takes place immediately while the scarring eﬀect takes place grad-
ually. Can reallocation in the longer run yield a procyclical contribution to produc-
tivity with the stronger dominance of the scarring eﬀect? This remains an interesting
empirical question.
This dissertation tries to theoretically improve our understanding of the link be-
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tween resource reallocation and productivity dynamics over business cycles. I hope it
will be a base for future research that looks more intensively into this direction. There
are many potential connections that have yet to be fully explored. For instance, Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982) argue that a representative-agent real business cycle model
with technological shocks can account for most of the observed aggregate fluctuations.
However, later empirical work by Basu (1997) suggests that the technological residual
interacts very little with output and input sequences once we control for increasing
returns, cyclical utilization and resource reallocation. Can a heterogeneous-agent
model with resource reallocation reconcile these papers by showing that the cyclical
resource reallocation is a natural response of the economy to technological shocks?
I believe there are many benefits to be gained from answering this question. The
resulting findings will undoubtedly allow economists to learn more about the sources
and consequences of business cycles.
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2 Plant Life Cycle and Aggregate Employment Dy-
namics
2.1 Introduction
Research on aggregate employment dynamics has focused on two separate compo-
nents: the number of jobs created at expanding and newly born plants (job creation)
and the number of jobs lost at declining and dying plants (job destruction). A key
stylized fact in this literature is that patterns of job creation and destruction diﬀer
significantly by plant age. In magnitude, job flow rates are larger for younger plants;
In cyclical responses, job destruction varies more over time than job creation for old
plants; but for young plants, their variations are much more symmetric.
This chapter proposes an explanation. I highlight the following relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of young and old plants in market competition. Intuitively,
old plants tend to be more productive since they have survived long; but they may
be using out-dated technologies or producing products flagging in popularity. On
the contrary, young plants, although lacking market experience, are more likely to be
technologically updated. If these are true over the plant life cycle and plants’ employ-
ment positively depends on their productivity, then there are multiple margins for a
plant to create or destroy jobs as it ages. Cyclical aggregate employment dynamics
involve the interactions of these diﬀerence driving forces.
I embody this intuition in an industry model whose employment dynamics are
driven by two forces — learning and creative destruction. In my model, technology
grows exogenously over time. Only entrants have access to the most advanced tech-
nology. Plants enter the market with the leading technology, but diﬀer in idiosyncratic
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productivity. A plant’s idiosyncratic productivity is not directly observable, but can
be learned over time. A plant increases its employment (creates jobs) when it learns
its true idiosyncratic productivity as high (a good plant); it exits (destroys jobs) when
learning its true idiosyncratic productivity as low (a bad plant). Meanwhile, as newly
born plants continually enter with more advanced technology, incumbents becomes
more and more technologically outdated. They tend to destroy jobs and eventually
leave the market at a certain age. This gives rise to a creative destruction process
that allows technologically more advanced entering plants to replace outdated ones.
The resulting employment dynamics match the observed magnitude of job flows
over the plant life cycle. Because learning diminishes with age, job creation and de-
struction decline with plant age; while large job flows still exist among mature plants
with outdated plants being replaced due to creative destruction. The model also
matches the observed cyclical pattern of job flows with plant age. The learning force
generates relative symmetric responses to business cycles on the creation and destruc-
tion sides, while the creative destruction force makes job destruction more responsive.
Since learning diminishes with plant age, the symmetric response of learning domi-
nates for young plants and the asymmetric response of creative destruction dominates
for old plants. Therefore, my model suggests that the variance ratio of job destruction
over job creation increases with plant age, as shown in the data.
Other work has also studied the sources and macroeconomic implications of the
relative variance of job creation and job destruction. Foote (1997) connects (S,s)
idiosyncratic productivity adjustments with trend employment growth and predicts a
tight relationship between trend growth and volatility of creation relative to destruc-
tion. In his analysis, a growing industry features a more responsive creation margin
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while a declining industry a more responsive destruction margin. Although his model
succeeds in explaining the diﬀerences in relative gross-flow volatility across sectors, it
cannot account for the high volatility of destruction within manufacturing or the high
volatility of creation within service sector. This paper diﬀers from Foote’s work by
emphasizing the within-sector diﬀerences in relative gross-flow volatility arising from
plant-level heterogeneity. Campbell and Fisher (2004) link plant age with relative
volatility of creation and destruction by modeling substitution between structured
and unstructured jobs over a plant life cycle. While it is diﬃcult to define struc-
tured and unstructured jobs empirically, their work does not feature the observed
pro-cyclical entry rate and counter-cyclical exit rate. These patterns are present in
the cyclical response of my model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I
describe the diﬀerences in young and old plants’ employment dynamics. In Section
3, I present my model, with which I analytically analyze the job flows over the plant
life-cycle in Section 4. A calibrated version of the model is studied numerically in
Section 5. I conclude in section 6.
2.2 Evidence: Gross Job flows and plant age
This section describes the observations of employment dynamics over the producer’s
life cycle that motivate my theory of learning and creative destruction. Two salient
facts emerge from the analysis carried out by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). The
first is that young plants display greater turnover rates than old plants. The second
is that, although job destruction is more volatile than job creation in general, this
asymmetry is weaker for younger plants.
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A. Means
Plant type E(Cb) E(Cc) E(C) E(Dd) E(Dc) E(D)
all 0.42 4.77 5.20 0.64 4.89 5.53
young 1.52 6.00 7.52 1.24 5.33 6.56
old 0.12 4.42 4.54 0.47 4.77 5.24
B. Standard deviations
Plant type σ(Cb) σ(Cc) σ(C) σ(Dd) σ(Dc) σ(D)
all 0.26 0.78 0.89 0.23 1.50 1.66
young 1.06 1.23 1.80 0.66 1.67 2.07
old 0.07 0.78 0.78 0.22 1.50 1.60
C. Variance ratio of job destruction to creation
plant type σ(D)2/σ(C)2 σ(Dc)2/σ(Cc)2
all 3.49 3.64
young 1.32 2.80
old 4.18 3.69
Table 1: Quarterly gross job flows from plant birth, plant death, and continuing
operating plants in the US manufacturing sector: 1973 II to 1988 IV. Cb denotes
job creation from plant birth, Dd job destruction from plant death, Cc and Dc job
creation and destruction from continuing operating plants. C and D represent gross
job creation and destruction. C=Cc+Cb, D=Dd+Dc. All numbers are in percentage
points.
My data source is DHS’s observations of job creation and destruction rates for
the US manufacturing sector. For a given population of plants, the job creation rate
in a period is defined as the total number of jobs added since the previous period at
plants that increased employment, divided by the average of total employment in the
current and previous periods. The job destruction rate is similarly defined in terms
of employment losses at shrinking plants. The diﬀerence between job creation and
destruction is the rate of job growth. As proposed by DHS, the sum of job creation
and destruction rates is used as a measure of job reallocation across plants.
For my comparison of young and old plants’ employment dynamics, I use DHS’s
quarterly job creation and destruction series for plants in three diﬀerent age categories.
11
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Figure 1: Job flows at young and old plants, 1972:2 — 1988:4. Dashed lines represent
the job creation series; solid lines represent job destruction.
As recommended by DHS,7 I aggregate the two categories that include the youngest
plants and refer to this combination as “young”. These plants are usually less than
10 years old and account for 22.5% of total employment on average over the sample
period. The remaining are referred to as “old”.8
Table 1A reports the sample means of the overall job creation (C), overall de-
struction (D), job creation from plant birth (Cb), job destruction from plant death
(Dd), and job creation and destruction from continuing operating plants (Cc and
7See DHS, p.225.
8Because of the sample design, the threshold between young and old plants changes slightly over
time. The minimum age of old plants is between 9 years and 13 years. See DHS, p. 225, for details.
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Dc) for young and old plants separately, as well as for the US manufacturing sector
as a whole.9 Table 1B reports sample standard deviations. The sample covers the
statistics from the second quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1988.
As shown in Table 1A and 1B, young plants’ average job creation and destruction
are both higher than those for old plants. So are the standard deviations. Table 1C
reports the relative variability of job creation and destruction. For the US manufac-
turing sector as a whole, the variance ratio of job destruction to job creation equals
3.49, so job destruction fluctuates much more than job creation. The variance ratio
is also considerably higher than one for old plants, 4.18. However, a more interesting
finding, as noted by DHS, is that young plants’ job creation and destruction rates
have approximately equal variances.
Figure 1 reinforces the above impression of greater variability of job flows at young
plants. It illustrates that job creation and destruction rates at young plants are visibly
more volatile. Moreover, the time series variability of creation and destruction seems
more symmetric for young plants than for old plants.
Because the observed frequency of plant exit declines with age and entering plants
are young by definition, it is important to consider the possibility that young and old
plants’ diﬀerent variances only reflect the concentration of entry and exit among young
plants. If I exclude the contributions of plant birth and death to the job creation and
destruction, the negative relationship between magnitude of job flows and plant age
is still evident. As shown in Table 1A, the average job creation and destruction from
9Notice that average job creation from plant birth is positive even for old plants. It seems strange
at the first sight, since by definition, an old plant cannot be newly born. DHS define plant birth and
plant age diﬀerently. Plant age is caculated based on the first time a plant has positive employment,
while plant birth is recorded as plants starting up. Most of the starting up plants age zero, but some
old plants’ employment can drop to zero temporarily and start to increase again. Also notice that
the contribution of “old plant birth” to old plants’ job creation is very small.
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continuing young plants are higher than those of continuing old plants. So are the
standard deviations shown in Table 1B. Table 1C suggests that, excluding plant birth
and death, job destruction still varies more than job creation: the variance ratio of
job destruction to creation is 2.80 for continuing young plants, and 3.69 for continuing
old plants. Moreover, this asymmetry is weaker for continuing young plants, as it is
for young plants’ overall job flows that include the contributions of plant birth and
death.
Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal a sharp relationship between plant age and job re-
allocation rates.10 Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report that this relationship exists
in very narrowly defined (four-digit) manufacturing industries, even with detailed
controls for size and other producer characteristics. This highlights the connection
between a producer’s life-cycle and its employment dynamics, which is modeled in
the next section.
2.3 A Model of Learning and Creative Destruction
Consider an industry of plants that produce a single good for sale in a competitive
product market. Plants use a single factor of production, labor, that they hire in
a competitive labor market. I refer to an employee working one period as a job.
Each plant can be thought of as an “institutional adoption of technology” with the
following three characteristics:
1. vintage;
2. idiosyncratic productivity;
10Similar patterns have also been found in data on job flows in France, Canada, Norway, Nether-
lands, Germany and U.K. See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
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3. a group of workers (jobs).
There is an exogenous technological progress {At}∞0 with a positive growth rate
γ so that:11
At = A0 · (1 + γ)t,
where A0 is a constant. With a as plant age, apparently the vintage of a plant of age
a in period t is,
At−a = A0 · (1 + γ)t−a,
Assuming discrete time, each period a continuum of plants enter embodied with the
latest technology. Incumbents do not have access to the latest technology.12 so that
young plants have technological advantages over old plants.
At the time of entry, a plant is endowed with idiosyncratic productivity θ, so
that plants of the same vintage(age) cohort diﬀer in idiosyncratic productivity. θ can
represent the talent of the manager as in Lucas (1978), or alternatively, the location of
the store, the organizational structure of the production process, or its fitness to the
embodied technology.13 The key assumption regarding θ is that its value, although
fixed at the time of entry, is not directly observable.
11See Caballero and Hammour (1994).
12This serves as a short-coming of my theory, and of the whole branch of vintage models. Not
allowing re-tooling, a business’s technology level is fixed and even good plants exit eventually. But
in the real world, some plants may stay long by keep updating their technology. DHS report that, in
US manufacturing, a large fraction of labor is concentrated on a small number of old plants. Their
finding is not present in my model, in which old plants tend to hire less labor due to out-moded
technology. For a model that allows re-tooling, see Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999).
13Since a firm is identical to a job under this set-up, θ can also be interpreted as “match quality.”
See Pries (2004).
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Production takes place through a group of workers. nt represents the employment
level of a plant in period t. The period-t output of this plant is given by
At−a ·Xt · (nt)α,
where α is between zero and one, and
Xt = θ + εt.
The shock εt is an i.i.d. random draw from a fixed distribution that masks the
influence of θ on output. I set the wage rate to 1 as a normalization, and let Pt denote
the equilibrium output price in period t. Then the profit generated by a plant of age
a and idiosyncratic productivity θ in period t equals Pt · At−a ·Xt · (nt)α − nt. Both
output and profit are directly observable. Since the plant knows its vintage, it can
infer the value of Xt. The plant uses its observations of Xt to learn about θ.
2.3.1 “All-Or-Nothing” Learning
Plants are price takers and profit maximizers. They attempt to resolve the uncer-
tainty about θ to decide on an employment level and whether to continue or terminate
production. The random component εt represents transitory factors that are inde-
pendent of the idiosyncratic productivity θ. By assuming that εt has mean zero, I
have Et(xt) = Et(θ) +Et(εt) = Et(θ).
Given knowledge of the distribution of εt, a sequence of observations of xt allows
the plant to learn about its θ. Although a continuum of potential values for θ is
more realistic, for simplicity it is assumed here that there are only two values: θg for
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a good plant and θb for a bad plant. Furthermore, εt is assumed to be distributed
uniformly on [−ω, ω]. Therefore, a good plant will have xt each period as a random
draw from a uniform distribution over [θg − ω, θg + ω], while the xt of a bad plant is
drawn from an uniform distribution over [θb − ω, θb + w]. Finally, θg, θb and ω satisfy
0 < θb − ω < θg − ω < θb + ω < θg + ω.
Pries (2004) shows that the above assumptions give rise to an “all-or-nothing”
learning process. With an observation of xt within (θb+ω, θg+ω], the plant learns with
certainty that it is a good plant; conversely, an observation of xt within [θb−ω, θg−ω)
indicates that it is a bad plant. However, an xt within [θg−ω, θb+ω] does not reveal
anything, since the probabilities of falling in this range as a good plant and as a bad
plant are the same (both equal to 2ω+θb−θg
2ω
).
This all-or-nothing learning simplifies my model considerably. Since it is θe instead
of θ that aﬀects plants’ decisions, there are three types of plants corresponding to the
three values of θe: plants with θe = θg, plants with θ
e = θb, and plants with θ
e =
θu, the prior mean of θ. I define “unsure plants” as those with θ
e = θu. I further
assume that the unconditional probability of θ = θg is ϕ, and let p ≡ θg−θb2ω denote the
probability of the true idiosyncratic productivity being revealed every period. Hence
a plant’s life-cycle is incorporated into the model as follows. A flow of new plants
enter the market as unsure; thereafter, every period they stay unsure with probability
1−p, learn they are good with probability p·ϕ and learn they are bad with probability
p · (1−ϕ). The evolution of θe from the time of entry is a Markov process with values
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Figure 2: Dynamics of a Birth Cohort with Learning: the distance between the
concave curve and the bottom axis measures the density of plants with θe = θg; the
distance between the convex curve and the top axis measures the density of plants
with θe = θb; and the distance between the two curves measures the density of unsure
plants (plants with θe = θu).
(θg, θu, θb), an initial probability distribution
µ
0, 1, 0
¶
,and a transition matrix


1 0 0
p · ϕ , 1− p , p · (1− ϕ)
0 0 1


.
If plants were to live forever, eventually all uncertainty would be resolved because
the market would provide enough information to reveal each plant’s idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. The limiting probability distribution as a goes to∞ is
µ
ϕ, 0, (1− ϕ)
¶
.
Because there is a continuum of plants, it is assumed that the law of large numbers
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applies, so that both ϕ and p are not only the probabilities but also the fractions of
unsure plants with θ = θg, and of plants who learn θ each period, respectively. Hence,
ignoring plant exit for now, the densities of the three groups of plants in a cohort of
age a as µ
ϕ · [1− (1− p)a] , (1− p)a, (1− ϕ) · [1− (1− p)a]
¶
,
which implies an evolution of the idiosyncratic-productivity plant distribution within
a birth cohort as shown in Figure 2, with the horizontal axis depicting the age of a
cohort over time. The densities of plants that are certain about their idiosyncratic
productivity, whether good or bad, grow as a cohort ages. Moreover, the two “learn-
ing curves” (depicting the evolution of densities of good plants and bad plants) are
concave. This feature is defined as the decreasing property of marginal learning in
Jovanovic (1982): the marginal learning eﬀect decreases with plant age, which, in
my model, is reflected by the fact that the marginal number of learners decreases
with cohort age. The convenient feature of all-or-nothing learning is that, on the one
hand, it implies that any single plant learns “suddenly”, which allows us to easily
keep track of the cross-section distribution of beliefs while, on the other hand, it still
implies “gradual learning” at the cohort level.
2.3.2 Creative Destruction and Industry Equilibrium
I now turn to the supply and demand conditions in this model, and to the economics of
creative destruction. I model a perfectly competitive industry in partial equilibrium.
Plants of diﬀerent vintages and beliefs may coexist. The mass of plants with age a
and belief θe in period t is denoted ft (θe, a).
The following sequence of events is assumed to occur within a period. First, entry
19
and exit occur by observing the aggregate state and perfectly predicting the current-
period price. Second, each surviving plant adjusts its employment and produces.
Third, the aggregate price is realized. Fourth, plants observe revenue and update
beliefs. Then, another period begins.
I assume costless employment adjustment each period so that a plant adjusts
its employment to solve a static profit maximization problem. With θe as a plant’s
current belief of its idiosyncratic productivity and Pt as the equilibrium price, I denote
firm’s employment as nt (θ
e, a). That is,
nt(θ
e, a) = argmax
nt≥0
Pt ·At−a ·Xt · (nt)α − nt (2.1)
= [α · Pt ·A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · θe] 11−α .
The corresponding expected value of the single-period profit maximized with respect
to nt is,
πt(θ
e, a;P,A) ≡ (α α1−α − α 11−α ) · £Pt ·A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · θe¤ 11−α . (2.2)
Let W > 0 be the expected present value of the plant’s fixed factor (its ”man-
agerial ability” or ”advantageous location”) if employed in a diﬀerent activity. The
value of W is the same for all plants in the industry regardless of their vintages and
idiosyncratic productivity. If a plant believes that the expected present discounted
value of staying is less than W , it chooses to exit.
Thus, the exit decision of a plant is forward-looking: plants have to form expecta-
tions about both current and future profits. It is a dynamic problem with five state
variables: 1) θe, the plant’s belief about θ; 2) P , the expected price sequences under
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possible paths of demand realizations; 3) A ≡ {At}∞0 , the technology sequence; 4)
time t, which determines where one is along the price sequence; 5) age a, which, com-
bined with time t, gives the vintage At−a.14 Let Vt(θe, a;P,A) be the value of staying
in the market for t’th period for a plant with age a, when the plant’s belief is θe, price
sequence is P and technology sequence is A. Then a plant has V that satisfies:
Vt(θ
e, a;P,A) = π(θe, a;P,A) + β ·Et{max[W,Vt+1(θe0 , a+ 1;P,A)]|θe}
I assume that parameters are such thatW > Vt(θb, a;P,A) for any a, t: the present
discounted value of life-time profit as a bad idiosyncratic productivity at any age is
always lower than the outside option value. Therefore, bad plants always exit.
Proposition 2.1: Vt (θe, a;P,A) is strictly decreasing in a, holding
θe constant, and strictly increasing in θe, holding a constant; therefore,
there is a cut-oﬀ age at (θe;P,A) for each idiosyncratic productivity, such
that firms of θe and age a ≥ at (θe;P,A) exit before production takes place
in period t; furthermore, at (θg;P,A) ≥ at (θu;P,A).
See the appendix for proof. This follows from the fact that plants with smaller a
and higher θe have higher expected value of staying. As V is strictly decreasing in a,
plants with belief θe that are older than at (θe;P,A) exit at the beginning of period
t; as the expected value of staying is strictly increasing in θe, the exit age of good
plants is older than that of unsure plants.
The industry also features continual entry. To fix the size of entry, I furthermore
14P is aﬀected by demand parameter D, as well as the distribution of heterogeneous plants. See
sub-section 3.2.3 for a more strict definition of the recursive competitive equilibrium.
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assume that each entrant has to pay an entry cost c to enter the market:
ct = c(ft(θ
e, 0)), c (·) > 0, c0 (·) ≥ 0.
I let the entry cost depend positively on the amount of entry to capture the idea
that, for the industry as a whole, fast entry is costly and adjustment may not take
place instantaneously. This can arise from a limited amount of land available to build
production sites or an upward-sloping supply curve for the industry’s specific capital.
The free entry condition equates a plant’s entry cost to its value of entry, and can be
written as
Vt (θu, 0;P,A) = c (ft (θu, 0;P,A)) .
As more new plants enter, the entry cost is driven up until it reaches the value of
entry. At this point, entry stops.
Let Qt represent the period-t aggregate output level. An equilibrium in this in-
dustry is a path
©
Pt, Qt, {ft(θe, a)}θe=θu or θg , a≥0
ª
, which satisfies the following con-
ditions: 1) plants’ entry, exit and employment decisions are optimal; 2) the evolution
of {ft(θe, a)} is generated by the appropriate summing-up of plants’ entry, exit and
learning: 3) Pt is such that
Dt = Qt · Pt, ∀t (2.3)
, whereDt is an fully observable exogenous demand parameter that captures aggregate
conditions. Industry cycles are driven by the fluctuations of Dt.
Proposition 2.2: With time-invariant demand level Dt = D, the value
of Pt ·At is also time-invariant; when demand fluctuates, Pt ·At fluctuates
with Dt.
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Proposition 2.2 suggests that Pt · At moves with the value of Dt. Aggregate
fluctuations aﬀect individual plant decisions through the fluctuations of Pt ·At.
2.4 Aggregate Employment Dynamics
This section uses the model to assess the impact on industry-level employment dynam-
ics of learning and creative destruction over the business cycle. Since industry-level
employment dynamics are computed by aggregating the individual decisions of plants,
I begin with the plant-level employment policy:
nt (θ
e, a) = [α · Pt ·A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · θe] 11−α = [α · Pt · Pt ·At
(1 + γ)a
· θe] 11−α
Because nt (θe, a) depends positively on belief θe, a plant increases its employment
(creates jobs) when it learns it is good, and exits (destroys jobs) once it learns it is
bad. Hence, the evolution of θe captures the learning eﬀect. With age a aﬀecting
nt negatively, a plant tends to decrease its employment (destroys jobs) as it grows
older (a increases), and eventually exits (destroys jobs). Therefore, (1 + γ)a captures
the creative destruction eﬀect. Whether a plant creates or destroys jobs also depends
further on Pt · At, the product of equilibrium price and the industry-wide leading
technology. I call the impact of Pt · At the industry shock eﬀect. These three eﬀects
interact together to drive plant-level and thus aggregate employment dynamics.
2.4.1 Job Flows over the Plant Life Cycle
Aggregate dynamics in job creation and destruction reflect the number of plants
choosing to adjust employment and the magnitude of their adjustment. In my model,
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Figure 3: Dynamics of a Birth Cohort with both Learning and Creative Destruction.
the distance between the lower curve (extended as the horizontal line) and the bottom
axis measures the density of good firms; the distance between the two curves measures
the density of unsure firms.
the response of plants varies systematically on both of these dimensions over the life-
cycle. Proposition 2.1 suggests that, because of creative destruction, the evolution of
the idiosyncratic-productivity distribution within a birth cohort shown in Figure 1
will be truncated by exit ages of unsure and good plants, as shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3 displays the life-cycle dynamics of a representative cohort with the hori-
zontal axis depicting the cohort age across time. All plants enter as unsure. As the
cohort ages and learns, bad plants are thrown out and good plants are realized. After
a certain age, all unsure plants exit because their vintage is too old to survive with
θe = θu. However, plants with θ
e = θg stay. Subsequently, the cohort contains only
good plants and its size remains constant because learning has stopped. Eventually,
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the vintage of the cohort will be too old even for good plants to survive.
Figure 3 also implies a job creation and destruction schedule over the plant life-
cycle. First, because all newly born plants begin with zero employment, they begin
their lives by job creation. As they age, the learning eﬀect drives job creation among
plants that discover they are good, and drives job destruction among plants that
discover they are bad. Meanwhile, the creative destruction eﬀect drives aging plants
that do not learn to destroy jobs. Upon a certain age, all plants end their lives by
job destruction.
As I have elaborated in Section 2.3, the concave learning curves suggest that the
marginal number of learners decreases as a cohort ages. Hence, as plants grow older,
the learning eﬀect weakens. Fewer and fewer plants create or destroy jobs because of
learning. Once all unsure plants have left, learning stops completely. On the contrary,
the creative destruction eﬀect strengthens with plant age. According to Proposition
2.1, older plants are more likely to exit (destroy jobs). At a certain age, all unsure
plants destroy jobs by exit; as the remaining good plants grow older, eventually they
destroy jobs too.
2.4.2 Decomposition of Job flows
To show the above intuition mathematically, I assume a variable xt such that
xt =
Pt
Pt−1
.
Let C(a, xt) denote the job creation rate of a cohort aged a in period t. I decompose
C(a, xt) into the sum of job creation from entry, denoted Centry(a, xt), job creation
from learning, denoted C learn(a, xt), and job creation from price increases, denoted
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C
price
t (a, xt):
C(a, xt) = C
entry(a, xt) + C
learn(a, xt) + C
price(a, xt).
Apparently, both Clearn(a, xt) and Cprice(a , xt) are zero for an entering cohort (a = 0),
so that
C(0, xt) = C
entry(0, xt) =
(αPtAtθu)
1
1−α
1
2
h
0 + (αPtAtθu)
1
1−α
i = 2, ∀xt.
For an incumbent cohort (a > 0), Centry(a, xt) = 0; its job creation from other
components are
C learn(a, xt) =
½
[xtθg]
1
1−α − θ
1
1−α
u
¾
pϕft−1(θu, a− 1)
1
2
x
1
1−α
t
·
ft(θu, a)θ
1
1−α
u + ft(θg, a)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u + ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
, (2.4)
and
Cprice(a, xt) =
µ
max
½
0, x
1
1−α
t − 1
¾¶

(1− p) ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u +
ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g


1
2
x
1
1−α
t
·
ft(θu, a)θ
1
1−α
u + ft(θg, a)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u + ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
. (2.5)
Here I have assumed that xtθg > θu.15 C learn(a, xt) depends on the number
15This assumption, which remains valid in my calibration exercise in the next sub-section, has
its support from U.S. manufacturing job-flow facts. As documented in DHS, quarterly job creation
among continuing operating plants, modeled here as the sum of POSlearnt (a) and POS
price
t (a),
stayed strictly positive from 1972 to 1988. Notice that, if xtθg ≤ θu instead so that POSlearnt (a)
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of plants who learn in period t they are good, represented by pϕft−1(θu, a − 1),
and how many jobs each of them creates, shown as (xtθg)
1
1−α − θ
1
1−α
u . Cpricet (a, xt)
captures possible job creation by plants not on the learning margin, including old
good plants and unsure plants that have not learned, the number of which are denoted
ft−1(θg, a− 1) and (1− p) ft−1(θu, a− 1). The term Cprice(a, xt) is driven by industry
shocks; if xt > 1, the term will be zero.
Similarly, the job destruction rate for an incumbent cohort aged a (a > 0) in
period t , denoted D(a, xt), can be decomposed as
D(a, xt) = D
learn(a, xt) +D
exit(a, xt) +D
price(a, xt),
where Dlearn(a, xt) denotes job destruction from learning, Dexit(a, xt) denotes that
from the exit of unsure and good plants, and Dprice(a, xt) denotes that from decreases
in price.
Dlearn (a, xt) =
θ
1
1−α
u p(1− ϕ)ft−1(θu, a− 1)
1
2
x
1
1−α
t
·
ft(θu, a)θ
1
1−α
u + ft(θg, a)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u + ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
(2.6)
drops to zero, POSpricet (a) would also be zero since θg > θu, together with xtθg ≤ θu, suggests
xt ≤ 1. In that case, there would be no job creation from continuing operating plants and my model
would not be able to match DHS’s documented facts of gross job flows.
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Dprice (a, xt) =
µ
max
½
0, 1− x
1
1−α
t
¾¶

(1− p) ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u +
ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g


1
2
x
1
1−α
t
·
ft(θu, a)θ
1
1−α
u + ft(θg, a)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u + ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
, (2.7)
Dlearn (a, xt) captures job destruction on the learning margin, with p(1−ϕ)ft−1(θu, a−
1) representing the number of plants who learn they are bad. It equals zero for cohorts
without unsure plants in period t− 1 (ft−1(θu, a− 1) = 0) since learning among these
plants has stopped. Dprice (a, xt) represents possible job destruction by plants not on
the learning margin. This job destruction is driven by industry shocks and occurs as
long as xt < 1. The plants aﬀected include old good plants and unsure plants that
have not learned.
The magnitude of Dexit(a, xt), job destruction from the exit of unsure or good
plants, is more complicated due to shifts of the exit margins. Let at (θu) represent
the period-t exit age of unsure plants and at (θg) that of good plants. When at (θu) >
at−1 (θu), unsure exit margin extends to an older age and no unsure plants are exiting.
Similarly, no good plants are exiting when at (θg) > at−1 (θg). If both margins extend
to older ages, then no plants are exiting and Dexit (a, xt) must be zero for any cohorts.
On the contrary, with at (θu) ≤ at−1 (θu), the unsure exit margin stays at the
same age or shifts to a younger age, so that one or more cohorts of unsure plants are
exiting. It can be shown that
Dexit(a, xt) =
θ
1
1−α
u ft−1(θu, a− 1)
1
2
x
1
1−α
t ft(θg, a)θ
1
1−α
g + 12
·
ft−1(θu, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
u + ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
¸
if a < at−1 (θu) + 1 and a ≥ at (θu) .
28
Similarly, with at (θg) ≤ at−1 (θg), the good exit margin stays at the same age or shifts
to a younger age, so that one or more cohorts of good plants are exiting. For these
cohorts, job destruction reaches its maximum value two, shown as follows:16
Dexit(a, xt) =
θ
1
1−α
g ft−1(θg, a− 1)
1
2
ft−1(θg, a− 1)θ
1
1−α
g
= 2
if a < at−1 (θg) + 1 and a ≥ at (θg) .
I conclude this sub-section by relating above decomposition of job flows to the
underlying driving forces. I argued earlier that plant-level employment is aﬀected
by the learning eﬀect, the creative destruction eﬀect, and the industry shock eﬀect.
Apparently, C learn and Dlearn come from the learning eﬀect. The creative destruc-
tion eﬀect drives Centry and Dexit: youngest plants enter, and the oldest plants exit.
However, the industry shock eﬀect and the creative destruction eﬀect together drive
Cprice and Dprice.
To see why, recall that the industry shock eﬀect is defined as the impact of PtAt.
With constant PtAt, there is no industry shock eﬀect, butDprice would still be positive
because
xt =
Pt
Pt−1
=
PtAt
Pt−1At−1(1 + γ)
=
1
(1 + γ)
< 1, when PtAt = Pt−1At−1.
This is due to the creative destruction eﬀect: a plant becomes more technologically
outdated by 1
(1+γ)
as it ages for another period. To see how creative destruction aﬀects
Cprice, let me assume that PtAt increases so that the industry shock eﬀect is present.
16Here I implicitly assume at−1 (θu) < at (θg) − 1, so that any cohorts with exiting good plants
included no unsure plants in period t− 1. This will the case in my calibration exercises.
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In that case, Cprice may not be positive because xt may not be greater than one: the
impact of PtAt’ s increase on xt needs to overcome the impact of 1(1+γ) . Hence, the
creative destruction eﬀect aﬀects Cprice by dampening the industry shock eﬀect.
2.4.3 The magnitude of job flows with no fluctuations
This sub-section establishes analytically a negative relationship between the average
magnitude of job flows and plant age in a version of my model with no fluctuations.
Variations inDt serve as the source of economic fluctuations in my model. Proposition
2.2 establishes that time-invariant Dt implies a time-invariant PtAt. With time-
invariant PtAt, the expected value of staying across a and θ
e would also be time-
invariant, which implies time-invariant size of entry and time-invariant exit ages.
Moreover, with PtAt = Pt−1At−1, xt equals a less-than-one value 1(1+γ) . Hence,
Cprice(a, 1
(1+γ)
) is zero so that job creation includes only Centry and C learn, while
Dprice(a, 1
(1+γ)
) stays positive. Let C∗(a) denote the job creation rate of a cohort aged
a with no fluctuations, D∗(a) the job destruction rate, and au∗ and ag∗ the exit ages
of unsure and good plants. I have:
C∗(a) = Centry(a,
1
(1 + γ)
) = 2, if a = 0
C∗(a) = C learn(a,
1
(1 + γ)
)
=
½h
θg
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α − θ
1
1−α
u
¾
pϕ
1
2
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
·
(1− p)θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a−1)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
, if 0 < a < au∗
C∗(a) = 0, otherwise
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Proposition 2.3: without demand fluctuations, the job creation rate
weakly decreases in cohort age.
Job creation strictly decreases in age for cohorts younger than au∗, because
ϕ(1−(1−p)a)
(1−p)a−1
increases in a. According to the all-or-nothing learning described in Sub-section 2.2,
ϕ(1− (1− p)a) is the fraction of good plants in a cohort aged a, and (1− p)a−1 the
fraction of unsure plants. The ratio of good plants to unsure plants increases in a
because of learning: for older cohorts, more plants have learned. Job creation drops
to and stays at zero for the group of plants older than au∗, since these plants have
already learned that they are good.
I also have:
D∗(a) = Dlearn(a,
1
(1 + γ)
) +Dprice(a,
1
(1 + γ)
)
=
θ
1
1−α
u p(1− ϕ)+µ
1−
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
¶

(1− p) θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a−1)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g


1
2
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
·
(1− p)θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a−1)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
, if 0 < a < au∗
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D∗(a) = Dprice(a,
1
(1 + γ)
) +Dexit(a,
1
(1 + γ)
)
=
µ
1−
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
¶·
ϕ(1−(1−p)a−1)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+ θ
1
1−α
u
1
2
x
1
1−α
t
·
ϕ(1−(1−p)a)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
+
1
2
·
θ
1
1−α
u +
ϕ(1−(1−p)a−1)
(1−p)a−1 θ
1
1−α
g
¸
, if a = au∗
D∗(a) = Dprice(a,
1
(1 + γ)
) =
1−
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
2
µ
1 +
h
1
(1+γ)
i 1
1−α
¶ , if au∗ < a < ag∗
D∗(a) = Dexit(a,
1
(1 + γ)
) = 2, if a = ag∗
Proposition 2.4: For small enough γ, job destruction weakly decreases
in cohort age for a 6= au∗ and a 6= ag∗.
For cohorts younger than a ≤ au∗, D∗(a) decreases in a because learning implies
that the ratio of good to unsure plants (ϕ(1−(1−p)
a)
(1−p)a−1 ) increases in a. For cohorts with
au
∗ < a < ag
∗, although learning has stopped, plants gradually decrease employment
(destroy jobs) due to technological obsolescence or creative destruction. Their job
destruction rate is as shown in 2.7. Notice that for small enough γ, the value of
1−[ 1(1+γ) ]
1
1−α
2

1+[ 1(1+γ) ]
1
1−α
 is close to zero, so that D∗(a)|a≤au∗ > D∗(a)| au∗<a<ag∗ .
Therefore, in the absence of industry shocks, the magnitude of job destruction
declines with plant age, except for the cohorts with exiting unsure plants or good
plants. These exceptions result from the simplified nature of all-or-nothing learning.
With plants either learning nothing or learning everything suddenly, the number of
beliefs is limited, so that upon a certain age, the force of creative destruction drives
out the whole group of plants with a certain belief. However, strictly speaking, these
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exceptions do not contradict with the empirical evidence. Notice that here a is the
number of quarters a plant has survived. But in Table 1A, the negative relationship
between the magnitude and plant age is shown by age categories. Hence, my model
can possibly produce patterns similar to these shown in Table 1A, even with these
exceptions.
2.4.4 Cyclical job flows with industry fluctuations
I introduce industry fluctuations by allowing Dt to vary over time. As stated in
Proposition 2.2, industry fluctuations aﬀect plant-level employment decisions through
the variations of PtAt. According to 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, variations of PtAt aﬀect
job creation and destruction through the variations of xt. Now the question is: can
my model generate variation in the cyclical responses of job creation and destruction
across age categories similar to those shown in Table 1 and Figure 1?
According to 2.4 and 2.6, the value of Clearn and Dlearn depend on the number
of learners and how much each learner adjusts. Holding fixed the variations of indi-
vidual adjustment caused by variations of xt, less learners imply smaller employment
variations at the cohort level. Since younger plants are more likely to be on the
learning margin, their job flows from learning should vary more with cyclical shocks.
Since plant birth are concentrated among young plants, variations in entry add to
the variations of young plants’ job creation. As analyzed earlier, Dexit, job destruction
from the exit of unsure and good plants, is aﬀected by shifts of exit ages. When exit
ages increase following a favorable shock, there is no exit of unsure or good plants for
cohorts close to the previous exit margins. When exit ages decrease, several cohorts
exit, giving rise to a jump in job destruction. Since exit ages apply only to older
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plants, job destruction may be more responsive to shocks for older plants.
Recall that, in the data, the variances of job flows decline in plant age; but job
destruction is more responsive to shocks than job creation for older plants. The
analysis of this sub-section suggests that my model has the potential to produce
these patterns. The negative relationship between the magnitude of job flows and
plant age can come from the cyclical job flows from learning (C learn and Dlearn).
Since learning weakens with plant age, the cyclical job flows from exit may dominate
older plants, implying a more responsive job destruction margin.
2.5 Quantitative Implications
This section numerically analyzes a stochastic version of my model in which the
demand level follows a two-state Markov process with states [Dh, Dl] and transition
probability µ. My computational strategy follows Krusell and Smith (1998) by shrink-
ing the state space into a limited set of variables and showing that these variables’
laws of motion can approximate the equilibrium behavior of firms in the simulated
time series.17 After solving for the approximate value functions, I calibrate my model
so that its equilibrium job flows mimic the observed patterns in U.S. manufacturing.
2.5.1 Calibration
The assigned parameter values are listed in Table 2. Some of the parameter values are
pre-chosen. I allow a period to represent one quarter and let the quarterly discount
rate β = 0.99. µ is set equal to 0.95, so that aggregate demand switches between
Dh and Dl with a constant probability of 0.05 per quarter. This implies that a given
17See Section 3.4 for the details of applying Krusell and Smith approach with a one-worker-per-firm
set-up. With multiple workers per plant in this chapter, the fit generally improves.
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parameters (pre-chosen) value
productivity of bad firms: θb 1
productivity of good firms: θg 3.5
quarterly technological pace: γ 0.0032
quarterly discount rate: β 0.99
entry cost function 0.405 + 0.52 ∗ f(0, θu)
persistence rate of demand: µ 0.95
high demand: Dh 10000
low demand: Dl 8500
parameters (calibrated) value
prior probability of being a good firm: ϕ 0.05
quarterly pace of learning: p 0.12
Outside option value: W 5
Table 2: Parameterization of the Model
demand level will persist for five years on average, consistent with business cycle fre-
quencies. The most significant parameters in this group are the relative productivity
of good and bad plants. I follow the choices of Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), who
assume a ratio of high-to-low productivity of 2.4 for total factor productivity and 3.5
for labor productivity based on the between-plant productivity diﬀerentials reported
by Bartelsman and Doms (1997). Since labor is the only input in my model, I nor-
malize productivity of bad plants as 1 and set productivity of good plants as 3.5.
The quarterly pace of technological progress γ is set equal to 0.0032, based on the
estimates of growth rates of TFP in US manufacturing sector by Basu, Fernald and
Shapiro (2001). Caballero and Hammour (1994) assume a linear entry cost function
c0 + c1 f(0, θu) with f(0, θu) denoting the size of entry, which is also applied in my
calibration exercises.
The values of p, the pace of learning, and ϕ, the probability of being a good firm,
are chosen to match the mean job creation and destruction rates for young plants
shown in Table 1A. I follow DHS in defining young plants as those younger than 40
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quarters (10 years) and old plants as all others. According to 2.8 and 2.9, the mean
job creation rate drops to zero for plants older than au∗. But this is not the case for
old plants in Table 1A. This suggests that au∗ > 40. Hence the value of ϕ and p are
set so that C∗(0 ≤ a ≤ 40) ≈ 7.52% and D∗(0 ≤ a ≤ 40) ≈ 6.56%. The implied
calibrated values are as shown in Table 2.
With the value of all other parameters assigned as above, I adjust the value of W ,
the outside option value, to make sure the followings. First, the expected value of
staying for bad plants is always lower thanW , so that bad plants always exit. Second,
the expected value of entry, or, in another word, the expected value of staying for
age-zero unsure plants, is always positive, so that entry never stops. W is set equal
to 5.
2.5.2 Simulations of aggregate employment dynamics
I simulate my calibrated model’s response to random demand realizations of 1000
periods generated by the model’s Markov chain. Figure 4 presents the time series of
detrended price, entry size, and exit ages of good and unsure plants. Young and old
plants’ job flow series by learning are shown in Figure 5. Job flows by entry and by
shifts of exit ages are in Figure 6. Figure 7 presents young and old plants’ job flows
by price variations. The related statistics are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4.
In Figure 4, all series move in the same direction: with higher demand, price
increases, more plants enter, and both exit margins extend to older ages. In Figures
5, 6, and 7, job creation and destruction co-move negatively, which matches DHS’s
finding that job creation is pro-cyclical but job destruction counter-cyclical. In Figure
5, job destruction from learning is higher than job creation from learning. This comes
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from my calibrated value of a plant’s probability of being good as 0.05. According
to the all-or-nothing learning, a probability of being good of 0.05 implies that 95%
of the learners exit by learning they are bad. It also suggests that, although learning
itself aﬀects job creation and destruction equally, destruction varies more with more
plants aﬀected. Notice that old plants’ job destruction by unsure and good plants’
exit is lower-bounded by zero in Figure 6. This matches my model’s intuition: Dexit
drops to zero when exit ages increase, and jumps up when exit ages decrease. Job
flows by price variations are also lower-bounded by zero: Dprice drops to zero when
xt is greater than one, and Cprice drops to zero when xt is less than one.
Table 3 displays statistics on gross job flows from my simulations together with
those from the data. The table suggests that a reasonably calibrated version of
my model reproduces, at least qualitatively, the observed diﬀerences in young and
old plants’ magnitude of job flows and the relative volatility in job creation and
destruction. As shown in Table 3, the sample means of job creation and destruction
decline in plant age; and the relative volatility in job creation and destruction is more
symmetric for young plants. These relationships are still present when job flows from
plant birth and death are excluded.
Table 4 takes one step further by reporting separately the decomposed sample
statistics of job flows by plant birth, plant death, and continuing plants. Job creation
by entry only contributes to young plants’ job flows. Job creation from continuing
plants (Cc) is decomposed into job creation by learning (C learn) and that by price
increases (Cprice). Since my simulated exit ages never drop below 40 quarters, young
plants’ job destruction from plant death (Dd) comes only from learning (Dlearn). Old
plants’ job destruction from plant death comes both from learning (Dlearn) and from
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Figure 4: Simulated Time Series of Detrended Price, Entry Size, and Exit Ages Of
Unsure and Good Plants. Detrended price = PtAt · (1 + γ). Entry size is calculated
as the amount of labor hired by entrants.
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Figure 5: Job Flows By Learning. Dashed lines job creation. Solid lines job destruc-
tion.
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Figure 6: Young Plants’ Job Creation by Entry and Old Plants’ Job Destruction by
Shift of Exit Ages.
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Figure 7: Job Flows by Price Variations. Dashed lines job creation. Solid lines job
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A. Means
Plant type E(Cb) E(Cc) E(C) E(Dd) E(Dc) E(D)
young (data) 1.52 6.00 7.52 1.24 5.33 6.56
old (data) 0.12 4.42 4.54 0.47 4.77 5.24
young (simu) 1.11 5.56 6.67 0.98 3.29 4.26
old (simu) 0 2.36 2.36 0.29 3.52 3.81
B. Standard deviations
Plant type σ(Cb) σ(Cc) σ(C) σ(Dd) σ(Dc) σ(D)
young (data) 1.06 1.23 1.80 0.66 1.67 2.07
old (data) 0.07 0.78 0.78 0.22 1.50 1.60
young (simu) 0.10 10.24 10.29 0.10 10.37 10.44
old (simu) 0 10.71 10.71 2.18 11.09 11.54
C. Variance ratio of job destruction to creation
Plant type σ(D)2/σ(C)2 σ(Dc)2/σ(Cc)2
young (data) 1.32 2.80
old (data) 4.18 3.59
young (simu) 1.03 0.2658
old(simu) 1.16 0.2781
Table 3: Quarterly gross job flows in the calibrated model and in US manufacturing
by plant age: 1973 II to 1988 IV. Notations are the same as Table 1. "data" indicates
statistics from the data, "simu" statistics from my simulations. All numbers are in
percentage points.
Cb Cc Dd Dc
Plant type E(Centry) E(C learn) E(Cprice) E(Dlearn) E(Dexit) E(Dprice)
young 1.11 3.35 2.21 0.98 0 3.29
old 0 0.02 2.34 0.006 0.28 3.52
Plant type σ(Centry) σ(C learn) σ(Cprice) σ(Dlearn) σ(Dexit) σ(Dprice)
young 0.10 0.28 10.06 0.10 0 10.37
old 0 0.002 10.71 0.0006 2.18 11.09
Plant type σ(Dlearn)2/σ(C learn)2 σ(Dprice)2/σ(Cprice)2
young 0.102 1.06
old 0.092 1.17
Table 4: Decomposed job flows in the calibrated model. C the job creation rate, D
the job destruction rate. "entry" indicates job flows by entry; "learn" job flows by
learning; "price" job flows by price variations; "exit" job flows by exit of unsure and
good plants. All numbers are in percentage points.
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unsure and good plants’ exit (Dexit). Table 4 suggests that learning contributes to the
negative relationship between the sample means of job flows and plant age in Table
3, since in Table 4, mean job flows by price variations and by unsure and good plants’
exit increase in plant age. Hence, the steady-state predictions of Propositions 2.3
and 2.4 remain valid in the stochastic version of the model. Table 4 also shows that,
although the relative volatility of job destruction to creation by learning decrease in
plant age ( a variance ratio of 0.102 for young, and 0.092 for old), old plants feature
more variations in job destruction due to price variations (a variance ratio of 1.06 for
young, and 1.17 for old) and exit of unsure and good plants.
In summary, Table 3 and Table 4 together confirm the conjectures posited in the
previous section. Because learning weakens with plant age, the magnitude of job
flows declines with plant age, and the cyclical patterns of job flows by exit and price
variations dominate in old plants, which features a more responsive job destruction
margin.
However, Table 3 also suggests that my calibrated model does not match the data
well in two respects. First, it cannot fully account for the large magnitude of job
flows in mature plants. In Table 3, the simulated sample means of job creation and
destruction for old plants are well below those in the data. This is especially the case
for job creation in old plants, with a sample mean of only 2.36% from the simulations
compared to 5.56% in the data. Second, the simulated standard deviations of job
creation and destruction are too high; moreover, although the standard deviation of
job destruction decreases in plant age in the data, it increases in my simulations.
I conclude from Table 4 that two features of my calibrated model contribute to the
above failings. The first is that learning in old plants seems too weak in my model.
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This is shown in Table 4 as a very low sample average of old plants’ job flow rates
by learning (0.02% for job creation and 0.006% for job destruction). This feature not
only drives down the magnitude of job flows in old plants in Table 3, but also causes
the cyclical patterns of job flows by exit and price variations over-dominate in old
plants (in Table 3, the standard deviation of job destruction fails to decline in plant
age, although the standard deviation of job destruction by learning does decline in
age). The second feature is that price variations generated by my model is too sharp,
so that when plants not on the learning margin adjust their employment, they adjust
too much. This can also be seen in Table 4: the standard deviations of old plants’
Cprice and Dprice are all very high. This feature drives up the simulated standard
deviations of job flow rates in Table 3.
Two of my simplifying assumptions may be responsible for these failures. First,
the assumption that aggregate demand can take on only two values leads to sharp
variations in price. Assuming that Dt follows a Markov chain with more states is
likely to improve this feature. Second, the all-or-nothing learning process gives rise
to an overly weak learning eﬀect in old plants, since there is no learning for plants
older than at (θu). Making the learning process more complicated may improve this
feature. For example, suppose that the random noise is normally distributed so that
the signals received by good plants are normally distributed around θg and the signals
received by bad plants are normally distributed around θb. In that case, a plant can
never know for sure that it is good or bad; even the oldest continuing operating plants
may adjust employment in the face of learning.
44
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I present a framework where two forces interact together to drive
micro-level job flows: creative destruction reallocates labor into technologically more
advanced production units; while learning leads labor to good plants. Two salient
stylized facts motivate my theory: The first is that young plants display greater
turnover rates than old plants. The second is that, although job destruction is more
volatile than job creation in general, this asymmetry weakens in younger plants.
The key of my explanation is that learning weakens with plant age. With this
feature, my model generates the observed negative relationship between the mean
magnitude of job flow rates and plant age. When demand fluctuates, the learning force
generates relatively symmetric responses on the creation and destruction sides, while
the creative destruction force makes job destruction much more responsive. Again,
because learning weakens with age, the relatively symmetric response of learning
dominates for young businesses and the asymmetric response of creative destruction
dominates for old ones.
I use the model to assess job-flow magnitude over a plant’s life cycle analytically
and calibrate the model to match the data quantitatively. Calibration results show
that my model does well in matching young businesses’ higher job-flow magnitude as
well as their relative symmetric volatility of job creation and destruction. However, it
cannot fully account for the magnitude of job flows among mature businesses because
of my assumption of a simplified all-or-nothing form of learning.
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3 The Scarring Eﬀect of Recessions
3.1 Introduction
How do recessions aﬀect resource allocation? This question has long attracted the at-
tention of economists. As far back as 1934, Schumpeter advanced the view of “cleans-
ing”: recessions are times when outdated or relatively unprofitable techniques and
products are pruned out of the productive system. This view has been revived since
the finding of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) that job reallocation in the U.S. manufac-
turing sector is concentrated during recessions.18 Attempting to explain these cyclical
patterns, an assortment of theoretical work has arisen returning to the Schumpeterian
cleansing view.19 In their arguments, production units with diﬀerent eﬃciency levels
coexist due to certain reallocation frictions; when recessions drive down profitability,
the least eﬃcient units should cease to be viable and shut down,20 which frees up
resources for more productive uses. Therefore, setting aside the losses to particular
businesses and individuals, reallocation during recessions leads to greater eﬃciency
in resource allocation.21
Despite solid theoretical reasoning, the cleansing view deviates from empirical
evidence in one important aspect – it implies countercyclical productivity, while
average labor productivity is in fact procyclical. This was pointed out by Caballero
18Similar evidence has also been found in the manufacturing sectors of Canada, Denmark, Norway
and Colombia. See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
19See Hall (1992, 2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996),
and Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001).
20These models assume perfectly competitive markets so that, as price takers, less eﬃcient units
are also less profitable. However, with market power, a less eﬃcient unit can be more profitable.
See Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003).
21However, these papers not necessarily suggest that recessions lead to higher welfare. In other
words, it is likely that higher allocation eﬃciency and lower welfare eﬃciency coexist during reces-
sions.
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and Hammour (1994), where who suggest that the cleansing eﬀect may be dwarfed
by other factors. Subsequent empirical work has challenged the cleansing view from
the creation side. For example, Bowlus (1993) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
(1996) find that jobs created during recessions tend to be short-lived, which inspired
Barlevy (2002) to question whether recessions encourage the creation of the most
eﬃcient units. However, although job destruction has been documented to be more
responsive to business cycles than job creation,22 few have yet asked the question,
“Are the production units cleared by recessions necessarily ineﬃcient?” If not, then
recessions might exacerbate the ineﬃciency of resource allocation instead of alleviating
it as the conventional cleansing view suggests.23
In this chapter, I propose a “scarring eﬀect” of recessions that plays against the
conventional cleansing eﬀect. I argue that while recessions drive out some of the
least productive firms, they also kill oﬀ “potentially good firms”; firms that have
the potential to be proven eﬃcient in the future are forced to leave due to reduced
profitability. The loss of potentially good firms leaves “scars” when a recession arrives,
and the “scars” deepen as the recession persists. The presence of the scarring eﬀect
revises the conventional view of recessions as periods of solely healthy reallocation:
the overall impact of recessions on allocative eﬃciency should depend on the relative
magnitude of two competing eﬀects – cleansing and scarring.
I oﬀer my explanation by combining the vintage model of Caballero and Ham-
22Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) document that job destruction tends to be more volatile than job
creation in manufacturing sectors. The variance of destruction divided by the variance of creation
is 2.04 for the U.S., 1.49 for Canada, 1.0 for Denmark, 2.68 for the Netherlands, 1.69 for Germany,
0.68 in Colombia, and 18.19 for the U.K..
23Ramey and Watson (1997) and Caballero and Hammour (1999) argue that job destruction
threshold in recessions can be socially ineﬃcient. However, their cyclical implications on productivity
are the same as in the models of the conventional cleansing eﬀect: average job quality goes up during
recessions.
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mour (1994) with learning in the spirit of Jovanovic (1982). As in Caballero and
Hammour (1994), exogenous technological progress introduces a force of creative
destruction that drives in technologically sophisticated entrants to displace older,
outmoded firms.24 However, in my model, firms of the same vintage also diﬀer in
idiosyncratic productivity: some are good and others are bad. A firm’s idiosyncratic
productivity can represent the talent of the manager, or alternatively, the store lo-
cation, the organizational structure of the production process, or its fitness to the
embodied technology. More importantly, firms’ idiosyncratic productivity are not
observable ex ante, but can be learned through experience. As information arrives,
firms choose to exit or stay, so that an additional learning force arises to keep good
firms and select out bad firms. Variations in aggregate demand serve as the source of
economic fluctuations. As a negative demand shock strikes and persists, the intensi-
fied creative destruction directs labor to younger, more productive vintage, causing a
cleansing eﬀect that raises average labor productivity; meanwhile, a truncated learn-
ing process shifts labor toward bad firms, creating a scarring eﬀect that pulls down
average labor productivity. The question then becomes, which eﬀect dominates? In
Section 4, I calibrate my model using data on U.S. manufacturing job flows and study
its quantitative implications. My results suggest that the scarring eﬀect dominates
the cleansing eﬀect in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993, and can
account for the observed procyclical average labor productivity.
My model stresses two frictions that stifle instantaneous labor reallocation. First,
entry is costly, which allows diﬀerent vintages to coexist. Second, learning takes time,
so that good and bad firms both survive. Vintage and idiosyncratic productivity
24The phrase “creative destruction” comes from Schumpeter (1939). It refers to the birth and
death of firms due to the introduction of new technology into the production process.
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together can explain the observed heterogeneous firm-level productivity. The vintage
component suggests that entering cohorts are more productive than incumbents.25
The idiosyncratic productivity component implies that each vintage cohort is itself a
heterogeneous group. Vintage and idiosyncratic productivity together also lead to the
following productivity dynamics. Creative destruction perpetually drives in entrants
with higher productivity. Learning selects out bad firms over time so that as a cohort
ages, its average productivity rises but productivity dispersion declines. Data from
the U.S. manufacturing sector provides large and pervasive empirical evidence to
support these predictions.26
The existing empirical literature has advanced learning and creative destruction as
powerful tools to understand the patterns of firm turnover and industrial dynamics.27
The significance of their interaction has also been suggested. Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999) note that “vintage eﬀects may be obscured by selection eﬀects; vintage and
selection eﬀects may also interact in important ways...” In my model, the interaction
of these two forces generates the scarring eﬀect of recessions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model com-
bining creative destruction with learning. The cleansing and scarring eﬀects are mo-
25Although this is often true in the data, some authors such as Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997) find
evidence that entrants are no more productive than incumbents. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson
(2003) propose an explanation by separating two measures for plant-level productivity: a revenue-
based measure and a quantity-based measure. They find that entrants are more productive than
incumbents in terms of the quantity-based measure, but not in the revenue-based measure because
entrants charge a lower price on average. Hence, more productive entrants can appear less profitable
when prices are not observed.
26For evidence on the cross-cohort and within-cohort productivity distribution, see Baldwin (1995),
Balk and Gort (1993), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003). For evidence on cohort productivity
dynamics, see Balk and Gort (1993) and Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh (2000).
27See Hall (1987), Evans (1987), Montgomery andWascher (1988), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson
(1989), Bresnahan and Raﬀ (1991), Bahk and Gort (1993), Caves (1998), Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999), and Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh (2000).
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tivated in Section 3 by comparative static exercises on the steady state equilibrium.
Section 4 numerically solves the model with stochastic demand fluctuations and stud-
ies its quantitative implications for productivity using data on U.S. manufacturing
job flows. I conclude in Section 5.
3.2 A Renovating Industry with Learning
This section describes a learning industry that experiences exogenous technological
progress. New firms that capture the leading technology are continuously being cre-
ated, and outdated firms are being destroyed. Firms enter with diﬀerent idiosyncratic
productivity. As time passes by, good firms survive and bad firms leave. Allocative
ineﬃciency comes from costly entry and time-consuming learning.
3.2.1 Firms
I consider an industry where labor and capital combine in fixed proportions to produce
a homogenous output. There is a continuum of firms, each hiring one worker, so that
a job is created when a firm enters and a job is destroyed when a firm exits. Each
firm is characterized by two components:
1. Vintage.
2. idiosyncratic productivity
There is an exogenous technological progress {At}∞0 that grows at a constant rate
γ > 0 so that
At = A0 · (1 + γ)t,
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where A0 is a constant. When a firm that enters the industry, it embodies the leading
technology, which becomes its vintage and will aﬀect its production afterward. I
assume that, only entrants have access to the updated technology, incumbents cannot
retool. Since technology grows exogenously, young firms are always technologically
more advanced than old firms. With a as the firm age, the vintage of a firm of age a
in period t is At−a. Apparently:
At−a = A0 · (1 + γ)t−a.
At the time of entry, a firm is endowed with idiosyncratic productivity θ. Hence,
firms of the same vintage diﬀer in idiosyncratic productivity. θ can represent the
talent of the manager as in Lucas (1978), or alternatively, the location of the store,
the organizational structure of the production process, or its fitness to the embodied
technology.28 The key assumption regarding θ is that its value, although fixed at
the time of entry, is not directly observable. We can think of some real-world cases
that reflect this assumption. For example, when a firm adopts new technology or
introduces a new product, it needs to make many decisions, such as picking a manager
to take charge of the production or choosing a location to sell the product. Although
all firms try to make the best decisions possible, the outcome of their choices is
uncertain and will be tested via market performance. Furthermore, their investments
are irreversible; once a manager has signed the contract and a store is built, it becomes
costly to make a new choice. Hence, the value of θ, as the consequence of a firm’s
random decisions, is unobservable and remains constant afterward.
28Since a firm is identical to a job under this set-up, θ can also be interpreted as “match quality.”
See Pries (2004).
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A firm of age a and idiosyncratic productivity θ produces output in period t,
according to
qt(a, θ) = At−a · xt = A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · xt, (3.1)
where
xt = θ + εt.
The shock εt is an i.i.d. random draw from a fixed distribution that masks the
influence of θ on output. I set the operating cost of a firm (including wages) to 1
by normalization, and let Pt denote the output price in period t. Then the profit
generated by a firm of age a and idiosyncratic productivity θ in period t is
πt (a, θ) = Pt ·A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · (θ + εt)− 1. (3.2)
Both qt(a, θ) and πt (a, θ) are directly observable. Since the firm knows its vintage,
it can infer the value of xt. The firm uses its observations of xt to learn about θ.
3.2.2 “All-Or-Nothing” Learning
Firms are price takers and profit maximizers. They attempt to resolve the uncertainty
about θ to decide whether to continue or terminate the production. The random
component εt represents transitory factors that are independent of the idiosyncratic
productivity θ. Assuming that εt has mean zero, we have
Et(xt) = Et(θ) +Et(εt) = Et(θ).
Given knowledge of the distribution of εt, a sequence of observations of xt allows
the firm to learn about its θ. Although a continuum of potential values for θ is
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more realistic, for simplicity it is assumed here that there are only two values: θg
for a good firm and θb for a bad firm. Furthermore, εt is assumed to be distributed
uniformly on [−ω, ω]. Therefore, a good firm will have xt each period as a random
draw from a uniform distribution over [θg − ω, θg + ω], while the xt of a bad firm is
drawn from an uniform distribution over [θb − ω, θb + w]. Finally, θg, θb and ω satisfy
0 < θb − ω < θg − ω < θb + ω < θg + ω.
Pries (2004) shows that the above assumptions give rise to an “all-or-nothing”
learning process. With an observation of xt within (θb+ω, θg+ω], the firm learns with
certainty that it is a good idiosyncratic productivity; conversely, an observation of xt
within [θb − ω, θg − ω) indicates that it is a bad idiosyncratic productivity. However,
an xt within [θg−ω, θb+ω] does not reveal anything, since the probabilities of falling
in this range as a good firm and as a bad firm are the same (both equal to 2ω+θb−θg
2ω
).
This all-or-nothing learning simplifies my model considerably. I let θe represent
the expected θ. Since it is θe instead of θ that aﬀects firms’ decisions, there are three
idiosyncratic productivity of firms corresponding to the three values of θe: firms with
θe = θg, firms with θe = θb, and firms with θe = θu, the prior mean of θ. I de-
fine “unsure firms” as those with θe = θu. I further assume that the unconditional
probability of θ = θg is ϕ, and let p ≡ θg−θb2ω denote the probability of true idiosyn-
cratic productivity being revealed every period. Firms enter the market as unsure;
thereafter, every period they stay unsure with probability 1− p, learn they are good
with probability p · ϕ and learn they are bad with probability p · (1− ϕ). Thus, the
evolution of θe from the time of entry is a Markov process with values (θg, θu, θb), an
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Figure 8: Dynamics of a Birth Cohort: the distance between the concave curve and
the bottom axis measures the density of firms with θe = θg; the distance between the
convex curve and the top axis measures the firms with θe = θb; the distance between
the two curves measures the density of unsure firms (firms with θe = θu).
initial probability distribution:
µ
0, 1, 0
¶
,
and a transition matrix


1 0 0
p · ϕ , 1− p , p · (1− ϕ)
0 0 1


.
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If firms were to live forever, eventually all uncertainty would be resolved because
the market would provide enough information to reveal each firm’s idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. The limiting probability distribution as a goes to ∞ is
µ
ϕ, 0, (1− ϕ)
¶
.
Because there is a continuum of firms, it is assumed that the law of large numbers
applies, so that both ϕ and p are not only the probabilities but also the fractions of
unsure firms with θ = θg, and of firms who learn θ each period, respectively. Hence,
ignoring firm exit for now, I have the densities of three groups of firms in a cohort of
age a as µ
ϕ · [1− (1− p)a] , (1− p)a, (1− ϕ) · [1− (1− p)a]
¶
,
which implies an evolution of the idiosyncratic-productivity firm distribution within
a birth cohort as shown in Figure 8, with the horizontal axis depicting the age of a
cohort across time. The densities of firms that are certain about their idiosyncratic
productivity, whether good or bad, grow as a cohort ages. Moreover, the two “learning
curves” (depicting the evolution of densities of good firms and bad firms) are concave.
This feature is defined as the decreasing property of marginal learning in Jovanovic
(1982): the marginal learning eﬀect decreases with firm age, which in my model is
reflected by the fact that the marginal number of learners decreases with cohort age.
The convenient feature of all-or-nothing learning is that, on the one hand, it implies
that any single firm learns “suddenly”, which allows us to easily keep track of the
cross-section distribution of beliefs, while on the other hand, it still implies “gradual
learning” at the cohort level.
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However, there is more that Figure 8 can tell. If we let the horizontal axis de-
pict the cross-sectional distribution of firm ages at any instant, then Figure 4 can be
interpreted as the firm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic productivity of an
industry that features constant entry but no exit. In this industry, cohorts contin-
uously enter in the same size and experience the same dynamics afterward, so that
at any one time, diﬀerent life-stages of diﬀerent birth cohorts overlap, giving rise to
the distribution in Figure 4. Under this interpretation, Figure 4 indicates that at any
instant older cohorts contain fewer unsure firms, because they have lived longer and
learned more.
3.2.3 The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The following sequence of events is assumed to occur within a period. First, entry
and exit occur after firms observe the aggregate state. Second, each surviving firm
pays a fixed operating cost to produce. Third, the aggregate price is realized. Fourth,
firms observe revenue and update beliefs. Then, another period begins.
With the above setup, this subsection considers a recursive competitive equilibrium
definition which includes as a key component the law of motion of the aggregate state
of the industry. The aggregate state is (F,D). F denotes the distribution (measure)
of firms across vintages and idiosyncratic productivity. The part of F that measures
the number of firms with belief θe and age a is denoted f (θe, a). D is an exogenous
demand parameter; it captures aggregate conditions and is fully observable. The law
of motion for D is exogenous, described by D’s transition matrix. The law of motion
for F is denoted H so that F 0 = H(F,D). The sequence of events implies that H
captures the influence of entry, exit and learning.
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Three assumptions characterize the equilibrium: firm rationality, free entry and
competitive pricing.
Firm Rationality: firms are assumed to have rational expectations; their decisions
are forward-looking. In period t, a firm with age a and belief θe expects its profit in
period s ≥ t to equal
At−a · E(Ps|Ft, Dt) · θe − 1.
Et(Ps|Ft,Dt) implies that firms need to observe (F,D) to predict the sequence of
prices from today onward. Therefore, the relevant state variables for a firm are its
vintage, its belief about its true idiosyncratic productivity, and the aggregate state
(F,D). I let V (θe, a;F,D) be the expected value, for a firm with belief θe and age
a, of staying in operation for one more period and optimizing afterward, when the
aggregate state is (F,D). Then V satisfies:
V (θe, a;F,D) = E [π (θe, a) |F,D] + βE [max (0, V (θe0, a+ 1;F 0, D0)) |F,D] (3.3)
subject to
F 0 = H (F,D)
and the exogenous laws of motion forD and θe ( driven by all-or-nothing learning).
Since firms enter as unsure, firm rationality implies that entry occurs if and only
if V (θu, 0;F,D) > 0. Meanwhile, a firm with belief θ
e and age a exits if and only if
V (θe, a;F,D) < 0.
Free entry: new firms are free to enter at any instant, each bearing an entry cost
c. The entry cost can be interpreted as the cost of establishing a particular location
or the cost of finding a manager. Assuming f (θu, 0;F,D) represents the size of the
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entering cohort when the aggregate state is (F,D), and letting c represent the entry
cost, I have
c = C (f (θu, 0;F,D)) , c > 0 and C 0 ≥ 0. (3.4)
I let the entry cost depend positively on the entry size to capture the idea that,
for the industry as a whole, fast entry is costly and adjustment may not take place
instantaneously. This can arise from a limited amount of land available to build
production sites or an upward-sloping supply curve for the industry’s capital stock.29
The free entry condition equates a firm’s entry cost to its value of entry, and can be
written as
V (θu, 0;F,D) = C (f (θu, 0;F,D)) . (3.5)
As more new firms enter, the entry cost is driven up until it reaches the value of entry.
At this point, entry stops.
Competitive Pricing: the output price is competitive; the price level is given by
P (F,D) =
D
Q (F,D)
(3.6)
Q represents aggregate output; it equals the the sum of production over heterogeneous
firms. Given (3.1), the sequence of events implies that:30
Q (F,D) = Q (F 0) = A
X
a
X
θe
(1 + γ)−a · θe · f 0 (θe, a) , (3.7)
whereA represents the industry leading technology when the aggregate state is (F,D).
29See Subsection 3.3.1 for further discussion.
30Q is the sum of realized output rather than expected output, since the contribution to aggregate
output by each firm depends on its true type θ rather than θe. However, with a continuum of firms,
the law of large numbers implies that the random noises and the expectation errors cancel out in
each cohort, so that the sum of realized output equals the sum of expected output.
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f 0 (θe, a) measures the number of operating firms with θe and a after entry and exit.
f 0 (θe, a) belongs to F 0, the updated firm distribution. Since F 0 = H(F,D), Q is a
function of (F,D).
(3.6) implies that high output drives down the price. (3.7) implies that Q depends
not only on the number of firms in operation, but also on their distribution. More
firms yield higher output and drive down the price; the more the distribution is skewed
toward younger vintages and better idiosyncratic productivity, the higher the output
and the lower the price.
With the above three conditions, I have the following:
Definition: A recursive competitive equilibrium is a law of motion H, a
value function V , and a pricing function P such that (i) V solves the
firm’s problem; (ii) P satisfies (3.6) and (3.7); and (iii) H is generated
by the decision rules suggested by V and the appropriate summing-up of
entry, exit and learning.
An additional assumption is made to simplify the model:
Assumption: Given values for other parameters, the value of θb is so low
that V (θb, a;F,D) is negative for any (F,D) and a.
This assumption implies that bad firms always exit, so that at any one time, there
are only two idiosyncratic productivity of firms in operation — unsure and good.
The following proposition characterizes the value function V and the correspond-
ing exit ages of heterogeneous firms.
Proposition 3.1: V (θe, a;F,D) is strictly decreasing in a, holding θe constant,
and strictly increasing in θe, holding a constant; therefore, there is a cut-
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oﬀ age a (θe;F,D) for each idiosyncratic productivity, such that firms of
idiosyncratic productivity θe and age a ≥ a (θe;F,D) exit before produc-
tion takes place; furthermore, a (θg;F,D) ≥ a (θu;F,D).
The proof for Proposition 3.1 presented in the appendix is not restricted to all-
or-nothing learning. Hence, Proposition 3.1 holds for any learning process. It follows
from the fact that firms with smaller a and higher θe have a higher expected value
of staying. As V is strictly decreasing in a, firms with belief θe that are older than
a (θe;F,D) exit; as the expected value of staying is strictly increasing in θe, a good
firm stays longer than an unsure firm.
3.3 Cleansing and Scarring
The firm distribution F enters the model as a state variable, which makes it diﬃcult
to characterize the dynamics generated by demand fluctuations. However, similar
studies find that the eﬀects of temporary changes in aggregate conditions are qualita-
tively similar to the eﬀects of permanent changes.31 Therefore, I begin in this section
with comparative static exercises on the steady-state equilibrium. The comparative
static exercises capture the essence of industry dynamics as well as how demand can
aﬀect the labor allocation, and thus provide a more rigorous intuition for the scarring
and cleansing eﬀects described in the introduction. In the next section, I will turn to
a numerical analysis of the model’s response to stochastic demand fluctuations and
confirm that the results from the comparative static exercises carry over.
31See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994 and 1996), and Barlevy
(2003).
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3.3.1 The Steady State
I define a steady state as a recursive competitive equilibrium with time-invariant
aggregate states.32 It satisfies two additional conditions, (i) D is and is perceived
as time-invariant: D0 = D. (ii) F is time-invariant: F 0 = H (F,D). Since H is
generated by entry, exit and learning, a steady state must feature time-invariant
entry and exit for F = H (F,D) to hold. Thus, a steady state equilibrium can be
summarized by {f(0), ag,au}, with f (0) as the entry size, ag as the maximum age
for good firms, and au as the maximum age for unsure firms. The next proposition
establishes the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium. The proof is presented
in the appendix.
Proposition 3.2: With D constant over time, there exists a unique time-invariant
{f(0), ag, au} that satisfies the conditions of firm rationality, free entry and competi-
tive pricing.
The steady-state labor distribution and job flows are illustrated in Figure 9. Like
Figure 8, there are two ways to interpret Figure 9. First, it displays the steady-state
life-cycle dynamics of a representative cohort with the horizontal axis depicting the
cohort age across time. Firms enter in size f (0) as unsure. As the cohort ages and
learns, bad firms are thrown out so that the cohort size declines; good firms are
realized, so that the density of good firms increases. After age au, all unsure firms
exit because their vintage is too old to survive with θe = θu. However, firms with
θe = θg stay. Afterwards, the cohort contains only good firms and the number of
good firms remains constant because learning has stopped. Good firms live until ag.
32The term “steady state” follows Caballero and Hammour (1994). Despite its name, the steady-
state price decreases while the steady-state average labor productivity increases over time due to
technological progress.
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Figure 9: The Steady-state Labor Distribution and Job Flows: the distance between
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density of good firms; the distance between the two curves measures the density of
unsure firms.
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The vintage after ag is too old even for good firms to survive.
Second, Figure 9 also displays the firm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic
productivity at any one time, with the horizontal axis depicting the cohort age cross
section. At the steady state, firms of diﬀerent ages coexist. Since older cohorts have
lived longer and learned more, their size is lower and their density of good firms is
higher. Cohorts older than au are of the same size and contain only good firms. No
cohort is older than ag.
Despite its time-invariant structure, the industry experiences continuous entry
and exit. With entry, jobs are created; with exit, jobs are destroyed. From a pure
accounting point of view, there are three margins for job flows: the entry margin, the
exit margins of good firms and unsure firms, and the learning margin. Two forces —
learning and creative destruction — interact together to drive job flows. At the entry
margin, creative destruction drives in new vintages. At the exit margins, it drives out
old vintages. At the learning margin, bad firms are selected out. Because of creative
destruction, average labor productivity grows at the technological pace γ. Because
of learning, the productivity distribution among older cohorts is more skewed toward
good firms. For cohorts older than au, labor is employed only at good firms.
3.3.2 Comparative Statics: Cleansing and Scarring
The previous subsection has shown that for a given demand level, there exists a
steady-state equilibrium summarized by {f(0), ag, au}. In this subsection, I establish
that across steady states corresponding to diﬀerent demand levels, the model delivers
the conventional cleansing eﬀect promoted in the previous literature, as well as an
additional scarring eﬀect. The two eﬀects are formalized in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
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Proposition 3.3: In a steady-state equilibrium, the exit age for firms with
a given belief is weakly increasing in the demand level and the job de-
struction rate is weakly decreasing in the demand level.
A detailed proof is included in the appendix. To understand Proposition 3.3,
compare two steady states with diﬀerent demand levels, Dh > Dl. For any time t,
(3.6) suggests that the steady state with Dl features either a lower price, or a lower
output, or both. Now assume initially that the lower demand is fully reflected as
a lower output and the prices of the two steady states are identical. Then firms’
profitability in the two steady states would also be identical: Vl (θ
e, a) = Vh (θ
e, a) for
any θe and a. Free entry and the exit conditions suggest that identical value functions
lead to identical entry size and exit ages, and thus an identical firm distribution.
With firm-level output of a given age and idiosyncratic productivity independent
of demand, identical cross-sectional distributions imply identical aggregate output,
which contradicts our assumption. Therefore, we can conclude that the low-demand
steady state must feature a lower price compared to the high-demand steady state, so
that Vl (θe, a) < Vh (θe, a) for any θe and a. Since V (θe, a) strictly decreases in a, the
cut-oﬀ age that solves the V (θe, a) = 0 must be lower for lower demand. Intuitively,
lower demand tends to drive down the price so that some firms that are viable in a
high-demand steady state are not viable when demand is low.
Moreover, the following equation is derived by combining the exit conditions for
unsure and good firms:
µ
θu
θg
+
pϕβ
1 + γ − β
¶
(1 + γ)ag−au = 1 +
pϕβ
1− β −
pϕβγ
(1− β) (1 + γ − β)β
ag−au (3.8)
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I prove in the appendix that (3.8) gives an unique solution for ag − au as long as
θg > θu. Since D does not enter (3.8), ag−au is independent of demand: d(ag−au)dD = 0.
(3.8) suggests that the demand level does not aﬀect the gap between the exit ages of
good and unsure firms.
The steady-state job destruction rate, denoted jdss, equals the following:33
jdss =
1
au · ϕ+ [1−ϕp + (ag − au) · ϕ] · [1− (1− p)au+1]
. (3.9)
Since (ag − au) is independent of D, demand aﬀects jdss only through its impact on
au:
d(jdss)
d(D)
= d(jd
ss)
d(au)
· d(au)
d(D)
. I prove in the appendix that d(jd
ss)
d(au)
≤ 0, which, together
with d(au)
d(D)
≥ 0, implies d(jd
ss)
d(D)
≤ 0. Put intuitively, a high-demand steady state allows
both unsure firms and good firms to live longer, so that fewer jobs are destroyed at
the exit margins.
To summarize, Proposition 3.3 argues that the steady state with lower demand
features younger exit ages and a higher job destruction rate. In other words, it
suggests that more firms are cleared out in an environment that is more diﬃcult for
survival.
If the above story suggested by comparative statics carries over when D fluctuates
stochastically over time, then my model delivers a conventional “cleansing” eﬀect, in
which average firm age falls during recessions so that recessions direct resources to
33According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), the job destruction rate at time t is defined as:
2 ∗ Jobs destroyed in period t
[(number of jobs at the beginning of period t) + (number of jobs at the beginning of period t+ 1)]
.
With constant total number of jobs, the steady-state job destruction rate equals the ratio of jobs
destroyed at the learning and exit margins over the total number of jobs. The expression of jdss
applies not only to a steady state, but also to any industry equilibrium that features time-invariant
entry and exit. See Subsection 4.2 for further discussions on jdss.
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younger, more productive vintages. However, once learning is allowed, we also need
to take into account the allocation of labor across idiosyncratic productivity. With
only two true idiosyncratic productivity, good and bad, the idiosyncratic productivity
distribution of labor can be summarized by the fraction of labor at good firms. A
higher fraction suggests a more eﬃcient cross-idiosyncratic productivity allocation of
labor. The next proposition establishes how the level of demand aﬀects this ratio in
a steady state.
Proposition 3.4: In a steady state equilibrium, the fraction of labor at
good firms is weakly increasing in the demand level.
It can be shown that the steady-state fraction of labor at good firms, denoted lssg ,
equals:
lssg = 1−
(1− ϕ)
pϕau
1−(1−p)au + (1− ϕ) + pϕ (ag − au)
.
Again, since (ag−au) is independent of D, demand aﬀects lssg only through its impact
on au:
d(lssg )
d(D)
=
d(lssg )
d(au)
· d(au)
d(D)
. I prove
d(lssg )
d(au)
≥ 0 in the appendix, which, together with
d(au)
d(D)
≥ 0, implies d(l
ss
g )
d(D)
≥ 0.
My analysis suggests that the impact of demand on the fraction of labor at good
firms comes from its impact on the exit age of unsure firms. To understand this result
intuitively, consider Figure 10.
Figure 10 displays the steady-state industry structures corresponding to two de-
mand levels.34 The cleansing eﬀect formalized in Proposition 3.3 is shown as the
34The entry sizes of the two steady states, although diﬀerent, are normalized as 1. Since the
steady state features time-invariant entry and all cohorts are the same size, entry size matters only
as a scale.
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leftward shift of the two exit margins. The shifted margins clear out old firms that
could be either good or unsure. However, the leftward shift of the unsure exit margin
also reduces the number of older good firms. The latter eﬀect, shown as the shaded
area in Figure 10, is the scarring eﬀect of recessions.
The scarring eﬀect stems from learning. New entrants begin unsure of their idio-
syncratic productivity, although a proportion ϕ are truly good. Over time, more and
more bad firms leave while good firms stay. Since learning takes time, the number
of “potentially good firms” that realize their true idiosyncratic productivity depends
on how many learning chances they have. If firms could live forever, eventually all
the potentially good firms would get to realize their true idiosyncratic productivity.
But a finite life span of unsure firms implies that if potentially good firms do not
learn before age au, they exit and thus forever lose the chance to learn. Therefore,
au represents not only the exit age of unsure firms, but also the number of learning
opportunities. A low au allows potentially good firms fewer chances to realize their
true idiosyncratic productivity, so that the number of old good firms in operation
after age au is also reduced.
Hence, the industry suﬀers from uncertainty; it tries to select out bad firms but
the group of firms it clears at age au includes some firms that are truly good. The
number of clearing mistakes the industry makes at au depends on the size of the
unsure exit margin, which in turn depends on the value of au.35 When a drop in
demand reduces the value of au, this reduces the number of learning opportunities,
allows fewer good firms to become old and thus shifts the labor distribution toward
bad firms.
35The all-or-nothing learning suggests that the number of truly good firms cleared out at au equals
f (0) (1− p)au ϕ.
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To summarize from Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, a low-demand steady state features
a better average vintage, yet a less eﬃcient cross-idiosyncratic productivity distrib-
ution of labor. If the comparative static results carry over when demand fluctuates
stochastically, then recessions will have both a conventional cleansing eﬀect, shifting
resources to better vintages, and a scarring eﬀect, shifting resources to bad idio-
syncratic productivity. The two eﬀects are directly related to each other: it is the
cleansing eﬀect that significantly reduces learning opportunities and hence prevents
more firms from realizing their potential.
When we move beyond steady states to allow for cyclical fluctuations, the intu-
ition behind “cleansing and scarring” still carries over. Consider Figure 6. Both exit
margins shift as soon as demand drops so that the cleansing eﬀect takes place imme-
diately.36 However, the scarring eﬀect takes place gradually. When a recession first
arrives, the group of firms already in the shaded area in Figure 6 will not leave despite
the shift in exit margins, since they know their true idiosyncratic productivity to be
good. They leave gradually as the recession persists. At this point, the scarring eﬀect
starts to take place: the reduced au allows fewer good firms to survive past au. The
shaded area would eventually be left blank, and the “scar” left by recessions would
surface.
3.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Two modifications are examined in this subsection to check the robustness of my
results from the comparative static exercises: first, I allow the entry cost to be inde-
36My numerical exercises imply that when demand falls, these margins initially shift more than
suggested by the comparative static exercises. The margins shift back partially as the recession
persists. A detailed discussion of this phenomenon is contained in Section 4.
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pendent of entry size; second, I allow the process of learning to be more complicated
than “all-or-nothing”.
Entry Cost Independent of Entry Size The previous subsection has argued that
the shift of the exit margins creates both a cleansing eﬀect and a scarring eﬀect. Now,
focus on the entry side. How does demand aﬀect entry, and how would alternative
assumptions on entry aﬀect my results?
To address these questions, recall that the free entry condition requires V (θu, 0) =
C (f (θu, 0)), and C is assumed to depend positively on entry size. Since low demand
reduces the value of entry by driving down profitability, C 0 (f (θu, 0)) > 0 implies less
entry (smaller f (θu, 0)) for the low-demand steady state. Hence, an industry in my
model has two margins along which it can accommodate low demand. It can either
reduce entry, or increase exit by shifting the exit margins. The issue is which of
these two margins will respond when demand falls, and by how much. If the drop in
demand level can be fully incorporated as a decrease in entry size, the exit margins
might not respond.
The extreme case that the entry margin exclusively accommodates demand fluc-
tuations is defined as the “full-insulation” case in Caballero and Hammour (1994).
They argue that creation (entry) “insulates” destruction (exit), and the extent of the
insulation eﬀect depends on the cost of fast entry, that is, C 0 (f (θu, 0)). The full-
insulation case occurs when C 0 (f (θu, 0)) = 0. The intuition is as follows. If entry
cost is independent of entry size, then fast entry is costless and the adjustment on
the entry margin becomes instantaneous. When demand falls, entry will adjust to
such a level that aggregate output falls by the same proportion, which keeps price at
the same level. Then the value of staying remain unaﬀected, and the exit margins
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do not respond. Hence, with entry cost independent of entry size, there is neither a
cleansing eﬀect nor a scarring eﬀect.
Two remarks can be made. First, in reality, an industry may not be able to create
all the necessary production units instantaneously. Goolsbee (1998) shows empirically
that higher investment demand drives up both the equipment prices and the wage
of workers producing the capital goods. His findings suggest that as more firms
enter and increase the demand for capital, it becomes increasingly costly to purchase
capital. As another intuitive example, when more new stores are built, land prices
and rentals usually rise. Therefore, C 0 (f (θu, 0)) > 0 seems more reasonable. Second,
data does not support the assumption that C 0 (f (θu, 0)) = 0. In the full-insulation
case, job creation fully accommodates demand fluctuations and job destruction does
not respond. This contradicts the large and robust evidence that job destruction is
more responsive than job creation to the business cycle.37
More Complicated Learning As I have argued in subsection 2.2, the all-or-
nothing learning with a uniform distribution of random noise simplifies the analysis
considerably. But how restrictive is it? Would the scarring eﬀect carry over with a
more complicated process of learning?
In general, we can define the scarring eﬀect as a drop in the fraction of labor at
good firms. To look at the scarring eﬀect from a diﬀerent angle, suppose we divide
firms into two groups, young and old.38 With log denoting the fraction of labor at
good firms among the old, lyg as the fraction among the young, f
y as the density of
young firms and fo as the density of old firms, the fraction of labor at good firms for
37See footnote 6.
38The cut-oﬀ age to define “young” and “old” is arbitrarily chosen. Changing this cut-oﬀ age does
not aﬀect the analysis that follows.
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the industry as a whole, lg, can be written as:
lg =
fylyg + f
olog
fy + fo
=
lyg + l
o
g
fo
fy
1 + f
o
fy
.
The first order derivative of lg with respect to
fo
fy equals:
d (lg)
d
³
fo
fy
´ = log − lyg
1 + f
o
fy
.
which is greater than or equal to zero as long as log− lyg ≥ 0, which should hold for any
learning process, since old firms have experienced more learning. Hence, the scarring
eﬀect of recessions should occur under any idiosyncratic productivity of learning as
long as recessions reduce the ratio of old to young firms ( f
o
fy ), which by definition
will be true in any model in which recessions cleanse the economy of older vintages.
Intuitively, the scarring eﬀect suggests that recessions shift resources toward younger
firms, so that there cannot be as much learning taking place as in booms.
Now suppose we assume a more complicated learning process with normally dis-
tributed random noise, so that the signals received by good firms are normally dis-
tributed around θg and the signals received by bad firms are normally distributed
around θb. In that case, a firm can never know for certain that it is good or bad, and
posterior beliefs are distributed continuously between θb and θg. The expected value
of staying would still depend positively on θe and negatively on age. Thus, given the
aggregate state, there would be a cut-oﬀ age for each belief, a (θe;F,D), such that
firms with belief θe do not live beyond a (θe;F,D).
With a recession, the value of staying across all ages and idiosyncratic productivity
falls, so that for each belief θe, the cut-oﬀ age a(θe;F,D) becomes younger. Hence,
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the firm distribution tilts toward younger ages and f
o
fy falls. Since
d(lg)
d( f
o
fy )
≥ 0, a fall
in f
o
fy drives down the ratio of good firms and creates the scarring eﬀect. Although
this analysis is preliminary,39 we can still argue that recessions would allow for less
firm learning, so the scarring eﬀect would carry over even with a more complicated
process of learning.
3.4 Quantitative Implications with Stochastic Demand Fluc-
tuations
I establish in Section 3 that across steady states, variations in demand induce compet-
ing cleansing and scarring eﬀects on productivity. In this section, I address whether
the two eﬀects carry over when demand fluctuates stochastically, and which eﬀect
dominates quantitatively.
This section turns to numerical techniques to analyze a stochastic version of my
model in which the demand level follows a two-state Markov process with values
[Dh,Dl] and transition probability µ. Throughout this section, firms expect the cur-
rent demand level to persist for the next period with probability µ, and to change
with probability 1− µ.
I first describe my computational strategy, which follows Krusell and Smith (1998)
by shrinking the state space into a limited set of variables and showing that these
variables’ laws of motion can approximate the equilibrium behavior of firms in the
simulated time series. Later in this section, I confirm that the basic insights from
the comparative static exercises carry over with probabilistic business cycles. Then I
39For instance, the analysis cannot address the relative sizes of the cleansing eﬀect on young firms
versus old firms. Whether cleansing aﬀects primarily young or old firms depends on the specifics of
the learning process.
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examine whether the scarring eﬀect is likely to be empirically relevant. Specifically, I
calibrate my model so that its equilibrium job destruction rate mimics the observed
pattern in U.S. manufacturing. As I have argued, recessions clear out old firms,
including some good firms that have not yet learned their idiosyncratic productivity.
Therefore, the model allows us to use the job destruction rate to make inferences on
the size of the cleansing and scarring eﬀects.
3.4.1 Computational Strategy
The definition of the recursive competitive equilibrium in Section 2 implies that indi-
vidual decision rules can be generated from the value functions V ; by summing up
the corresponding individual decision rules, we can get the laws of motion H, then
trace out the evolution of industry structure. Therefore, the key computational task
is to map F , the firm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic productivity, given
demand level D, into a set of value functions V (θe, a;F,D). Unfortunately, the en-
dogenous state variable F is a high-dimensional object. The numerical solution of
dynamic programming problems becomes increasingly diﬃcult as the size of the state
space increases. To make the state space tractable, I define a variable X such that40
X (F ) =
X
a
X
θe
(1 + γ)−a · θe · f (θe, a) . (3.10)
Combining (3.9) with (3.6) and (3.7), I get
P (F,D) ·A = D
X (F 0)
.
40X can be interpreted as detrended output.
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A is the leading technology; F 0 is the updated firm distribution after entry and
exit; X 0 corresponds to F 0; P (F,D) is the equilibrium price in a period with initial
aggregate state (F,D). Since F 0 = H(F,D), the above equation can be re-written as
P (F,D) ·A = D
X (H (F,D))
Given these definitions, the single-period profitability of a firm of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity θe and age a, given aggregate state (F,D), equals
π (a, θ;F,D) =
D
X (H (F,D))
· (1 + γ)−a · (θ + ε)− 1. (3.11)
Thus, the aggregate state (F,D) and its law of motion help firms to predict future
profitability by suggesting sequences of X’s from today onward under diﬀerent paths
of demand realizations. The question then is: what is the firm’s critical level of
knowledge of F that allows it to predict the sequence of X 0s over time? Although
firms would ideally have full information about F , this is not computationally feasible.
Therefore I need to find an information set Ω that delivers a good approximation of
firms’ equilibrium behavior, yet is small enough to reduce the computational diﬃculty.
I look for an Ω through the following procedure. In step 1, I choose a candidate
Ω. In step 2, I postulate perceived laws of motion for all members of Ω, denoted HΩ,
such that Ω0 = HΩ (Ω, D). In step 3, given HΩ, I calculate firms’ value functions on a
grid of points in the state space of Ω applying value function iteration, and obtain the
corresponding industry-level decision rules — entry sizes and exit ages across aggregate
states. In step 4, given such decision rules and an initial firm distribution,41 I simulate
41I start with a uniform firm distribution across types and ages. My numerical exercises suggest
that the dynamic system of my model is stable and that the initial firm distribution does not aﬀect
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Ω {X}
HΩ
Hx(X,Dh): logX 0 = 1.2631 + 0.8536 logX
Hx (X,Dl) : logX 0 = 2.4261 + 0.7172 logX
R2
for Dh: 0.9876
for Dl: 0.9421
standard forecast error
for Dh: 0.0000036073%
for Dl: 0.000030068%
maximum forecast error
for Dh: 0.000049895%
for Dl: 0.00074675%
Den Haan &Marcet test sta-
tistic (χ27)
0.8007
Table 5: The Estimated Laws of Motion and Measures of Fit
the behavior of a continuum of firms along a random path of demand realizations,
and derive the implied aggregate behavior – a time series of Ω. In step 5, I use the
stationary region of the simulated series to estimate the implied laws of motion and
compare them with the perceived HΩ; if diﬀerent, I update HΩ, return to step 3 and
continue until convergence. In step 6, once HΩ converges, I evaluate the fit of HΩ
in terms of tracking the aggregate behavior. If the fit is satisfactory, I stop; if not,
I return to step 1, make firms more knowledgeable by expanding Ω, and repeat the
procedure.
I start with Ω = {X} – firms observe X instead of F . I further assume that
firms perceive the sequence of future coming X 0s as depending on nothing more than
the current observed X and the state of demand. The perceived law of motion for X
is denoted Hx so that X 0 = Hx (X,D). I then apply the procedure described above
and simulate the behavior of a continuum of firms over 5000 periods. The results
are presented in Table 5 As shown in Table 5, the estimated Hx is log-linear. The
fit of Hx is quite good, as suggested by the high R2, the low standard forecast error,
the result.
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Figure 11: Expected Value of Staying: aggregate state variables are D and logX (the
log of detrended output), firm-level state variables are firm age and belief (good or
unsure); the parameter choices underlying these figures are summarized in Table 2
and discussed in Subsection 4.2.
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Figure 12: Industry-level Policy Functions: Entry Size and Exit Ages. Aggregate
states are D (booms or recessions) and logX (the log of detrended output).
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and the low maximum forecast error. The good fit when Ω = {X} implies that firms
perceiving these simple laws of motion make only small mistakes in forecasting future
prices. To explore the extent to which the forecast error can be explained by variables
other than X, I implement the Den Haan and Marcet (1994) test using instruments
[1,X, µa, σa, γa, κa, ru], where µa, σa, γa, κa,ru are the mean, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis of the age distribution of firms, and the fraction of unsure
firms, respectively.42 The test statistic is 0.8007, well below the critical value at the
1% level. This suggests that given the estimated laws of motion, I do not find much
additional forecasting power contained in other variables. Nevertheless, I expand Ω
further to include σa, the standard deviation of the age distribution of firms. The
results when Ω = {X,σa} are presented in the appendix. The measures of fit do not
change much.43 Furthermore, the impact of changes in σa on the approximated value
function is very small (less than 0.5%). This confirms that the inclusion of information
other than X improves the forecast accuracy by only a very small amount.
Figure 11 displays the value of staying for heterogeneous firms as a function of
a, θe, D and X (logX). Figure 12 displays the corresponding optimal exit ages and
entry sizes. The properties of value functions and exit ages stated in Proposition
3.2 are satisfied in both figures: given the aggregate state, the value of staying is
increasing in the perceived idiosyncratic productivity θe and decreasing in firm age;
42Den Haan and Marcet (1994) oﬀer a statistic for computing the accuracy of a simulation. It has
an asymptotic χ2 distribution under the null that the simulation is accurate. The statistic for my
industry is given by TB
0
TA
−1
T BT , where BT =
1
T
X
ut+1⊗h (Gt), AT = 1T
X
u2t+1⊗h (Gt)h (Gt)
0,
ut+1 is the expectation error for Xt+1(or logXt+1), and h (Gt) is some function of variables dated
t. I choose h (Gt) = [1,X, µa, σa, γa, κa, ru], which gives my test statistic 7 degrees of freedom.
43Actually the fit during recessions becomes worse to some extent. Young (2002) adds an additional
moment to the original Krusell & Smith approach, and also gets a worse measure of fit for the bad
state (recessions). He attributes this result to numerical error.
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parameters (pre-chosen) value
productivity of bad firms: θb 1
productivity of good firms: θg 3.5
quarterly technological pace: γ 0.007
quarterly discount factor: β 0.99
parameters (calibrated) value
high demand: Dh 2899
low demand: Dl 2464
prior probability of being a good firm: ϕ 0.14
quarterly pace of learning: p 0.08
persistence rate of demand: µ 0.58
entry cost function 0.405 + 0.52 ∗ f(0, θu)
Table 6: Base-line Parameterization of the Model
and good firms exit at an older age than unsure firms.
To conclude, Table 5 and Figures 11 and 12 suggest that my solution using X
to approximate the aggregate state closely replicates optimal firm behavior at the
equilibrium.44 Therefore, I use the solution based on Ω = {X} to generate all the
series in the subsequent analysis.
3.4.2 Calibration
Table 6 presents the assigned parameter values. Some of the parameter values are pre-
chosen. The most significant in this group are the relative productivity of good and
bad firms. I follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), who assume a ratio of high-to-low
productivity of 2.4 for total factor productivity and 3.5 for labor productivity based
on the between-plant productivity diﬀerentials reported by Bartelsman and Doms
44These results were robust when I experimented with diﬀerent parameterizations of the model.
Although they suggest that my approximation is good, one could say that these are self-fulfilling
equilibria: because everyone perceives a simple law of motion, they behave correspondingly so that
the aggregate states turn out as predicted. However, it has been diﬃcult to prove theoretically the
existence of such self-fulfilling equilibria in my model.
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(1997). Since labor is the only input in my model, I normalize productivity of bad
firms as 1 and set productivity of good firms as 3.5. I allow a period to represent one
quarter and set the quarterly discount factor β = 0.99. Next, I need to choose γ, the
quarterly pace of technological progress. In a model with only creative destruction,
Caballero and Hammour (1994) choose the quarterly technological growth rate as
0.007 by attributing all output growth of US manufacturing from 1972 (II) to 1983
(IV) to technical progress. To make comparison with their results convenient in the
coming subsections, I also choose γ = 0.007. Caballero and Hammour (1994) assume
a linear entry cost function c0 + c1 f(0, θu) with f(0, θu) denoting the size of entry,
which is also applied in my calibration exercises.
The remaining undetermined parameters are: p, the pace of learning; ϕ, the
probability of being a good firm; Dh and Dl, the demand levels; µ, the probability
with which demand persists; and c0 and c1, the entry cost parameters. The values of
these parameters are chosen so that the job destruction series in the calibrated model
matches properties of the historical series from the U.S. manufacturing sector. Their
values are calibrated in the following manner.
First, I match the long-run behavior of job destruction. My numerical simulations
suggest that the dynamic system eventually settles down with constant entry and exit
along any sample path where the demand level is unchanging. The industry structures
at these stable points are similar to those at the steady states, which allows me to use
steady state conditions for approximation.45 I let ag and au represent the maximum
ages of good firms and unsure firms at the high-demand steady state and ag 0 and
45However, a stable point is diﬀerent from a steady state. In a steady state, firms perceive
demand as constant, while in a stable point, firms perceive demand to persist with probability µ,
and to change with probability 1− µ.
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au
0 represent the exit ages at the low-demand steady state. The steady-state job
destruction rate, denoted jdss, is given by (3.9).
Second, I match the peak in job destruction that occurs at the onset of a recession.
My model suggests that the jump in the job destruction rate at the beginning of a
recession comes from the shift of exit margins to younger ages. I assume that when
demand drops, the exit margins shift from ag and au to ag 0 and au0 immediately, so
that the job destruction rate at the beginning of a recession, denoted as jdmax, is
approximately:46
jdmax =
2 ·
ϕ
h
1− (1− p)au+1
i
(ag − ag 0)+h
1
p
+ ϕ− 1− 1
p
(1− p)au−au
0i
(1− p)au
0+1+
(1− ϕ)
ϕ (au + au
0) + (1−ϕ)
p
h
2− (1− p)au+1 − (1− p)au
0+1
i
+
ϕ
h
1− (1− p)au+1
i
(ag − au) + ϕ
h
1− (1− p)au
0+1
i
(ag
0 − au0)
(3.12)
Third, I match the trough in job destruction that occurs at the onset of a boom.
My model suggests that when demand goes up, the exit margins extend to older ages,
so that for several subsequent periods job destruction comes only from the learning
margin, implying a trough in the job destruction rate. The job destruction rate at
this moment, denoted as jdmin, is approximately:
jdmin =
(1− ϕ)
h
1− (1− p)au
0+1
i
au
0 · ϕ+ [1−ϕ
p
+ (ag
0 − au0) · ϕ] · [1− (1− p)au0+1]
(3.13)
46As I have noted earlier, the calibration exercises suggest that when a negative aggregate demand
shock strikes, the exit margins shift more than ag 0 and au0. The bigger shift implies a bigger jump
in job destruction, This is why I require negmax to lie below 11.60%. I experiment with diﬀerent
demand levels to find those that generate the closest fit.
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Descriptive Statistics Mean Min. Max. Std.
Value 5.6% 2.96% 11.60% 1.66%
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Job Destruction in U.S. Manufacturing
(1972:2-1993:4), constructed by Davis and Haltiwanger.
Now I turn to data for conditions on jdss, jdmax, and jdmin. Table 7 lists descriptive
statistics for the job destruction series of the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972:2
to 1993:4 compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger. This data places three restrictions on
the values of p, ϕ, ag, au, ag 0 and au0. First, the implied jdss with either (ag, au) or
(ag
0, au0) must be around 5.6%.47 Second, the implied jdmax must not exceed 11.6%.
Third, the implied jdmin must be above 3%. Additionally, (ag, au) and (ag 0, au0) must
satisfy (3.8), the gap between the exit ages of good and unsure firms suggested by
the steady state. There are six equations in total to pin down the values of these six
parameters. Using a search algorithm, I find that these conditions are satisfied for
the following combination of parameter values: p = 0.06, ϕ = 0.18, ag = 78, au = 62,
ag
0 = 73, au0 = 57. By applying these ag, au, ag 0 and au0 to the steady state industry
structure, I find Dh = 2899 and Dl = 2464.
The value of µ is calibrated to match the observed standard deviation of the job
destruction rate. In my model, the job destruction rate jumps above its mean when
demand drops and falls below when demand rises. Thus, the frequency of demand
switches between Dh and Dl determines the frequency with which the job destruction
rate fluctuates between 11.6% and 3%, which in turn aﬀects the standard deviation
of the simulated job destruction series. My calibration exercises suggest µ = 0.58.
Finally, the entry cost parameters are adjusted to match the observed mean job
creation rate of 5.19%.
47The job destruction rate implied by (ag 0, au0) is slightly higher since ag 0 < ag and au0 < au.
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3.4.3 Response to a Negative Demand Shock and Simulations of U.S.
Manufacturing Job Flows
With all of the parameter values assigned, I approximate firms’ value functions apply-
ing the computational strategy described in subsection 4.1. With the approximated
value functions, the corresponding decision rules and an initial firm distribution, I
can investigate the dynamics of my model’s key variables along any particular path
of demand realizations, and study the model’s quantitative implications.
Scarring and Cleansing over the Cycle To assess the eﬀect of a negative de-
mand shock, I start with a random firm distribution and simulate my model with
demand level equal to Dh for the first 200 quarters. Regardless of the initial firm
distribution, I find that the exit age of good firms settles down to 76, the exit age of
unsure firms settles down to 62, the job destruction rate converges to 5.38%, and the
fraction of good firms converges to 49.8%. This suggests that my model is globally
stable. Once the key variables converge, I simulate the eﬀects of a negative demand
shock that persists for the next 87 quarters.
The dynamics of the job destruction rate and the job creation rate are illustrated in
Panel 1 of Figure 13, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting the onset of a recession. The
job destruction rate goes up from 5.38% to 10.84% on impact. Thus, the immediate
eﬀect of a negative demand shock is to clear out some firms that would have stayed
in had demand remained high. After 70 quarters, the job destruction rate converges
to 5.63%, still above its original value. Hence, the conventional cleansing eﬀect of
demand on job destruction that I establish analytically in steady state carries over
with probabilistic cycles.
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Unlike the job destruction rate, the job creation rate drops from 4.69% to 4.32%
when a recession strikes, rises gradually and converges later. This matches the finding
of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) that the job creation rate falls during recessions and
co-moves negatively with the job destruction rate over the cycle.48
The analysis of the steady state also suggests that recessions will bring a scarring
eﬀect by shifting labor resources toward bad firms. As shown in Panel 2 of Figure
13, the fraction of labor at good firms drops from 49.8% to 48.07% when the negative
demand shock strikes and converges to 47.87% after 70 quarters. This implies that
the negative demand shock shifts the cross-idiosyncratic productivity firm distribution
toward bad firms. Hence, the scarring eﬀect suggested by the steady-state analysis
also carries over with probabilistic business cycles.
Two remarks are in order regarding the response of the fraction of labor at good
firms to a negative demand shock. First, the initial drop in lg at the onset of a
recession contradicts my argument in Section 3.2 that the scarring eﬀect takes time
to work. My calibration exercises suggest that this feature is robust and can be
understood as follows. Recessions shift both exit margins to younger ages. While the
shift of the exit margin for unsure firms clears out both bad firms and good firms,
the shift of the exit margin for good firms clears out only good firms, so that in total
more good firms are cleared out than bad firms initially and lg drops at the onset
of a recession. Since lg eventually converges to a value below the initial drop, and
the initial drop in lg also stems from learning, this result does not hurt my argument
that in a model with learning, recessions create a scarring eﬀect by shifting resources
toward bad firms.
48Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.17 of job destruction and
job creation for the U.S. Manufacturing from 1947:1-1993:4.
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Figure 13: Response to a Negative Demand Shock: vin is the detrended average
labor productivity driven only by the cleansing eﬀect, prod is the detrended average
labor productivity driven by both the cleansing eﬀect and the scarring eﬀect. Scar =
prod−vin. The horizontal axis denotes quarters, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting
the onset of a recession.
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Second, the response of lg shown in Panel 2 is hump-shaped: it drops initially,
increases gradually, then declines again. This feature is mainly due to the response of
the exit margins over the cycle. When a recession first strikes, the exit margins over-
shift to the left, and shift back gradually as the recession persists. As the exit margin
for unsure firms shifts back, more good firms are allowed to reach their potential;
meanwhile, as the exit margin for good firms shifts back, no old good firms exit for
several quarters. Hence, lg increases after the initial drop. The exit margins reach
their stable points after about 20 quarters. From then on, lg starts to fall, with old
good firms gradually being cleared out but not enough new good firms being realized.
Another part of this hump-shaped response comes from the entry margin. Because
they have had no time to learn, newly entered cohorts have the least eﬃcient cross-
idiosyncratic productivity firm distribution in the industry, so that entry tends to
drive down lg. When entry falls in a recession, the negative impact of entry on lg is
also reduced, which contributes to part of the increase in lg after the initial drop.
To summarize, despite some transitory dynamics, Panel 1 and Panel 2 of Figure
13 suggest that both the conventional cleansing eﬀect established in Proposition 3.2,
and the scarring eﬀect established in Proposition 3.3, carry over with probabilistic
business cycles.
Implications for Productivity Next, I turn to the quantitative implications of
the model for the cyclical behavior of average labor productivity. With one worker
per firm setup and firm-level productivity given by A·θ
(1+γ)a , average labor productivity
is aﬀected by A, the level of the leading technology, and the firm distribution across
a and θ. While technological progress drives A, and thus average labor productivity,
to grow at a trend rate γ (the technological pace), demand shocks add fluctuations
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around this trend by aﬀecting the labor distribution across a and θ.
To analyze the fluctuations of average labor productivity over the cycle, I define
de-trended average labor productivity as the average of θ
(1+γ)a over heterogeneous firms.
In evaluating this measure, recall that there are two competing eﬀects. On the one
hand, the cleansing eﬀect drives down the average a by lowering the cut-oﬀ ages for
each idiosyncratic productivity, causing average labor productivity to rise. On the
other hand, the scarring eﬀect drives down the average θ by shifting resources away
from good firms, causing average labor productivity to fall. To separate the two
eﬀects, I generate two indexes for average labor productivity. The first index is the
average of θ
(1+γ)a across all firms in operation, defined as the following:
prod =
P
f
³
θe
(1+γ)a
´
· f (θe, a)P
f
f (θe, a)
.
This measure is aﬀected by both cleansing and scarring eﬀects. The other index is
the average of 1
(1+γ)a across all existing firms, defined as:
vin =
P
f
³
1
(1+γ)a
´
· f (θe, a)P
f
f (θe, a)
.
This measure is aﬀected only by the cleansing eﬀect. To compare the relative mag-
nitude of these two eﬀects, their initial levels are both normalized as 1. Since only
the cleansing eﬀect drives the dynamics of vin but both cleansing and scarring eﬀects
drive the dynamics of prod, the gap between vin and prod reflects the magnitude of
the scarring eﬀect. A scarring index measures this gap. It is defined as:
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scar = prod− vin.
Panel 3 in Figure 13 traces the evolution of vin and prod in response to a negative
demand shock. As the negative demand shock strikes, the cleansing eﬀect alone
raises the average labor productivity to 1.013 while the scarring eﬀect brings the
average labor productivity down to 0.9974. After 70 quarters, prod converges to 0.9947
while vin converges to 1.0126. The dynamics of the scarring index in response to a
negative demand shock is plotted in Panel 4 of Figure 13. The scarring index remains
negative following a negative demand shock and eventually converges to −0.0179.
This matches the predictions of my model that the scarring eﬀect plays against the
conventional cleansing eﬀect during recessions by shifting resources away from good
firms, driving down the average labor productivity.
3.4.4 Simulation of U.S. Manufacturing Job Flows
To gauge whether the scarring eﬀect is likely to be relevant at business cycle frequen-
cies, I simulate my model’s response to random demand realizations generated by
the model’s Markov chain. I perform 1000 simulations of 87 quarters each. Results
are presented in Table 8. The reported statistics are means (standard deviations)
based on 1000 simulated samples. Sample statistics for U.S. Manufacturing data for
the 87 quarters from 1972 (II) to1993(IV) are included for comparison. In the table,
jd and jc represent the job destruction and job creation rate; prod and q represent
de-trended average labor productivity and de-trended output.
Table 8 suggests that my calibrated model can replicate the observed patterns of
job flows; moreover, the positive correlation coeﬃcient of 0.1675 between prod and q
implies that my model generates procyclical average labor productivity for the U.S.
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simulation statistics data
jdmean 5.29%(0.0100%) 5.6%
jdstd 1.65%(0.3100%) 1.66%
jcmean 4.72%(0.0581%) 5.19%
jcstd 0.72%(0.0595%) 0.95%
corr(prod, q) 0.1675(0.7504) 0.5537∗
Table 8: Means (std errors) of 1000 Simulated 87-quarter Samples: jd is the job de-
struction rate, jc is the job creation rate, prod is detrended average labor productivity,
q is detrended aggregate output. Data comes from the U.S. Manufacturing job flow
series for 1972:2-1993:4, compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger. *Detrended average
labor productivity is calculated as output per production worker, with output mea-
sured by industrial production index. The quarterly series of industrial production
index of U.S. manufacturing sector for 1972:2-1993:4 comes from the Federal Reserve
and the series of total production workers comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
manufacturing sector in the relevant period. Put diﬀerently, under my benchmark
calibration the scarring eﬀect on cyclical productivity dominates the cleansing eﬀect.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis of the Dominance of Scarring over
Cleansing
In the baseline parameterization of subsection 4.2, I followed Caballero and Ham-
mour (1994) in setting the quarterly technological pace γ equal to 0.007. The value
was estimated by attributing all output growth of the U.S. manufacturing sector to
technological progress, which may exaggerate the technological pace in the relevant
period. An alternative estimate of γ, has been provided by Basu, Fernald and Shapiro
(2001), who estimate TFP growth for diﬀerent industries in the U.S. from 1965 to 1996
after controlling for employment growth, factor utilization, capital adjustment costs,
quality of inputs and deviations from constant returns and perfect competition. They
estimate a quarterly technological pace of 0.0037 for durable manufacturing, a pace
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Calibration Results γ = 0.003 γ = 0.007
calibrated p 0.0830 0.0800
calibrated ϕ 0.1200 0.1420
Response to a Negative
Demand Shock
vin (when a recession
strikes)
1.0052 1.0130
vin (70 quarters after a re-
cession strikes)
1.0029 1.0126
prod (when a recession
strikes)
0.9866 0.9974
prod (70 quarters after a re-
cession strikes)
0.9820 0.9947
scar (when a recession
strikes)
−0.0186 −0.0156
scar (70 quarters after a re-
cession strikes)
−0.0209 −0.0179
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis to a Slower Technological Pace (I): prod is detrended
average labor productivity, driven by both the cleansing and the scarring eﬀects, vin
is the component of detrended average labor productivity driven only by the cleansing
eﬀect, scar = prod - vin. Other parameter values are as shown in Table 2.
of 0.0027 for non-durable manufacturing and an even slower pace for other sectors.
How would a slow pace of technological progress aﬀect the magnitudes of the
scarring and cleansing eﬀects? To address this question, I re-calibrate my model
assuming γ = 0.003, matching the same moments of job creation and destruction as
before, and simulate responses to a negative demand shock. The results are presented
in Table 9 together with results from the baseline parameterization.
The calibration results in Table 9 suggest that the model with γ = 0.003 needs a
faster learning pace (p = 0.083 compared to 0.08) and a smaller prior probability of
firms’ being good (ϕ = 0.120 compared to 0.142) to match the observed moments of
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simulation sta-
tistics with
γ = 0.003
simulation sta-
tistics with
γ = 0.007
data
jdmean 5.73%(0.0799%) 5.29%(0.0100%) 5.6%
jdstd 1.42%(0.2800%) 1.65%(0.3100%) 1.66%
jcmean 5.14%(0.0565%) 4.72%(0.0581%) 5.19%
jcstd 0.34%(0.0059%) 0.37%(0.0535%) 0.95%
corr(prod, q) 0.4819(0.5212) 0.1675(0.7504) 0.5537
Table 10: Sensitivity to A Slower Technological Pace (II): Means (std errors) of 1000
Simulated 87-quarter Samples. Definitions, measures and data sources are the same
as Table 4.
job flows.49 The simulated responses suggest that slower technological progress mag-
nifies the scarring eﬀect, weakens the cleansing eﬀect, and magnifies the procyclical
behavior of productivity.
This result can be explained as follows. First, slower technological progress implies
that the force of creative destruction is weak. A lower γ weakens the technical dis-
advantage of old firms and allows both good firms and unsure firms to live longer, so
that less job destruction occurs at the exit margins. A lower γ also implies a smaller
cleansing eﬀect on average labor productivity. A recession clears out marginal firms
by shifting the exit margins toward younger ages. The size of the shift is pinned
down in my calibration exercises by matching jdmax ≈ 11.6%. Given the shift of exit
margins, a slower technological pace shrinks the productivity diﬀerence between the
vintages that have been killed and the ones that have survived, so that the impact of
49Consider (9), the expression of jdss, for intuition. My calibration exercises look for parameter
values that satisfy three moment conditions on job flows, one of which is that jdss ≈ 5.6%. Propo-
sition 3 establishes that jdss decreases with the exit ages (ag and au). It can be further shown that
it increases in p but decreases in ϕ. A slower technological pace weakens the technical disadvantage
of old firms and extends their life span so that both ag and au tend to increase. Hence, the job
destruction rate would decrease if p and ϕ remain the same. A faster learning pace and a lower prior
probability of being good are thus needed to match the observed mean job destruction. Thus, the
paramerization of my model with γ = 0.003 suggests that more job destruction comes from learning
rather than creative destruction.
92
the cleansing eﬀect on average labor productivity declines.
Second, when I assume a lower γ, I must also assume a higher p and a lower ϕ to
match the moments of job destruction. This re-calibration implies a larger role for
learning in job destruction: firms not only learn faster, but are more likely to learn
that they are bad. This also gives a larger scarring eﬀect on average labor produc-
tivity: a faster learning pace implies a higher opportunity cost of not allowing unsure
firms to survive; a smaller prior probability of being good suggests that learning has
a greater marginal impact on cross-idiosyncratic productivity eﬃciency.
Table 10 reports the simulation statistics of 1000 simulated 87-quarter samples
when γ = 0.003. Results when γ = 0.007 and sample statistics from data are included
for comparison. My model with γ = 0.003 generates a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.4819
between detrended average labor productivity and detrended output. Productivity is
strongly procyclical, almost as much as in the data.
3.6 Cost of Business Cycles with Heterogeneous Firms
This sub-section explores possible welfare cost of business cycles with the scarring
eﬀect’s presence. Suppose my modeled industry’s output is consumed by a represen-
tative consumer, whose utility depends positively on the level of consumption. Then
lower output implies lower consumption and consequently lower welfare. Since the
scarring eﬀect drives down average labor productivity during recessions, it can lead
to lower equilibrium output, and hence imply a welfare cost.
To proceed, I compare the output series of two industries, a cyclical industry
whose demand follows a Markov chain and a steady-state industry with time-invariant
demand. I let the steady-state industry’s demand equal the cyclical industry’s average
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Figure 14: Time Series of Detrended Output of a Cyclical industry and a Steady-
state Industry. Dashed line represents the average of cyclical output. This figure is
generated using the base-line calibration, with the steady-state industry’s demand
level assumed equal to the cyclical industry’s average demand level.
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Figure 15: Time Series of Output with Trend of a Cyclical Industry and a Steady-
state Industry. This figure is generated with the base-line calibration, assuming the
steady-state industry’s demand equal to the cyclical industry’s average demand.
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demand. The results are shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. Both figures are generated
with baseline calibrations. The cyclical industry’s demand switches between 2899 and
2464 with probability 0.42 (1−0.58). This implies an average demand of 2657, which
is applied as the steady-state industry’s demand.
Figure 14 presents the time series of the two industries’ de-trended output. The
cyclical industry’s de-trended output fluctuates around a mean of 5515.8, below the
steady-state industry’s de-trended output of 5910.6. Figure 15 shows the two indus-
tries’ output series with technological progress added. Both industries’ outputs grow.
But only the cyclical industry’s output fluctuates around the growth trend. Moreover,
the cyclical output series stay strictly below the steady-state output series.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 suggest that, in my model’s framework, more output
would be produced if business cycles could be eliminated. Hence, business cycles
may possibly bring a welfare cost of a representative consumer who consumes the
industry’s output.
The discussion of welfare cost of business cycles traces back to Lucas (1987), who
put forth an argument that the welfare gains from reducing the volatility of aggregate
consumption is negligible. Subsequent work that revisited Lucas calculation continued
to find only small benefits from reducing the consumption volatility, reinforcing the
perception that business cycles do not matter. However, with a heterogeneous-firm
setup, my model argues from the supply side that the business cycles reduces the
average output by aﬀecting production eﬃciency. In Lucas’ argument, eliminating
business cycles only eliminates the consumption volatility, but does not aﬀect the
mean of consumption. My model suggests that, eliminating business cycles may
raise up the mean by providing more output.50 Although my analysis here is very
50Since consumption grows over time, this mean refers to the mean of detrended consumption.
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preliminary,51 it does point out an interesting research direction.
3.7 Conclusion
How do recessions aﬀect resource allocation? My theory suggests learning has impor-
tant consequences for this question. I posit that in addition to the cleansing eﬀect
proposed by previous authors, recessions create a scarring eﬀect by interrupting the
learning process. Recessions kill oﬀ potentially good firms, shift resources toward
bad firms and exacerbate the allocative ineﬃciency in an industry. The empirical
relevance of the scarring eﬀect is examined in Section 4. Using data on U.S. man-
ufacturing job flows, I find that the scarring eﬀect dominates the cleansing eﬀect in
the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993, and can account for the observed
degree of procyclical productivity.
The scarring eﬀect stems from learning. Recessions bring a scarring eﬀect by
limiting the learning scope. Figure 3 of the paper provides intuition. Recessions force
firms to exit at earlier ages. The shortened firm life allows less learning time, so that
fewer truly good firms get to realize their potential and the shaded area in Figure 3
would disappear. The decrease in the fraction of labor at good firms implies a less
eﬃcient allocation of labor during recessions.
My theory highlights a firm’ age as an indicator for its number of learning op-
portunities. The existing empirical literature documents that firm age has important
A higher mean of detrended cosumption (output) is shown in Figure 15: although both growing
over time, the steady-state series with a higher detrended mean stays strictly above the other series.
Another interesting exploration of the welfare cost of business cycles is Barlevy (2003), who posits
that eliminating cycles may give rise to a higher growth rate of consumption.
51A more careful exploration of this question should study cyclical labor supply and cyclical
equilibrium labor input. Seperating the cleansing eﬀect from the scarring eﬀect is also important.
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explanatory power for micro-level job flow patterns.52 My model predicts that the
mean and the dispersion of firm age both decline during recessions, while the pro-
ductivity dispersion within an age cohort goes up on average. These are testable
hypotheses with detailed data on the age distribution of firms over the cycle.
The empirical relevance of the scarring eﬀect remains to be explored in a wider
framework. My calibration exercises have focused on the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor, where job destruction is more responsive to business cycles than job creation.
However, Foote (1997) documents that in services, fire, transportation and commu-
nications, retail trade, and wholesale trade, job creation is more volatile than job
destruction. Would relatively more responsive job creation hurt the dominance of the
scarring eﬀect? It could, since recessions leave “scars” by killing oﬀ potentially good
firms on the destruction side. It may not, because a larger decline in job creation
also introduces fewer potentially good firms on the creation side. Whether “scarring”
dominates “cleansing” in sectors other than manufacturing remains an interesting
question.
52See Caves (1998) for an extensive review of recent findings on firm turnover and industrial
dynamics.
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 and 3.1(three steps):
Step1: to prove that V (θ
e,a;F,D)
∂a
< 0:
Proof. Compare two firms with same belief θe, but diﬀerent ages a1 > a2. To prove
V (θe,a;F,D)
∂a
< 0, I need to show that
V (θe, a1;F,D) < V (θ
e, a2;F,D) .
Suppose that the aggregate state is (F,D) at the beginning of period t0. I assume
there are n diﬀerent possible paths of demand realizations from t0 onward, each with
probability pi, where i = 1, ..., n. I also assume that under the i’th path of demand
realizations, the firm with a1 expects itself to exit at the end of period ti1 ≥ t0 and
the firm with a2 expects itself to exit at the end of period ti2 ≥ t0, then:
V (θe, a1;F,D) =
nX
i=1
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0E
£
πit (θ
e, a1 + t− t0) |F,D
¤ª · pi,
and
V (θe, a2;F,D) =
nX
i=1
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0E
£
πit (θ
e, a2 + t− t0) |F,D
¤ª · pi,
where πit (θ
e, a1 + t− t0) is the expected profit (of a firm with current age a1
and current belief θe) at period t ≥ t0 under demand path i. Firms have rational
expectations and expect a price sequence {P it (F,D)}t≥t0 conditional on the realization
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of path i. Since price is competitive and firms are price takers, I must have:
V (θe, a1;F,D) =
nX
i=1
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0
£
A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1
¤ª · pi
and
V (θe, a2;F,D) =
nX
i=1
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª · pi.
There are three possibilities for any i.
Possibility 1, if ti1 = t
i
2 = t
i:
since A (t0 − a1) < A (t0 − a2),
(t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1 < A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1
holds for any t. Hence,
tiX
t=t0
©
βt−t0
£
A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1
¤ª
<
tiX
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª
Possibility 2, if ti1 < t
i
2:
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then it must be true that,
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª
=
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª+
ti2X
t=ti1+1
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª ,
and hence,
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0
£
A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1
¤ª
<
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª ,
Possibility 3, if ti1 > t
i
2:
when it comes to period ti2 under path i, the firm aged a1+ t
i
2− t0 chooses to stay
and the firm aged a2 + ti2 − t0 decides to leave. Based on the exit condition, it must
be true that,
V
¡
θe, a1 + t
i
2 − t0;F 0,D0
¢
> 0andV
¡
θe, a2 + t
i
2 − t0;F 0, D0
¢
< 0.
The firm aged a1 + ti2 − t0 chooses to stay to capture the potential profit
ti1X
t=ti2+1
n
βt−t
i
2 · £A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤o
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and he expects those future profits can cover any possible cost if demand path does
not goes as expected. Since
ti1X
t=ti2+1
n
βt−t
i
2 · £A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤o
<
ti1X
t=ti2+1
n
βt−t
i
2 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤o ,
the firm aged a2 + ti2 − t0 should have expected even higher potential profits in the
future which is worth waiting for. Hence, it must not choose to leave at period ti2.
Therefore, ti1 > t
i
2 cannot be true.
1), 2) and 3) help me conclude that:
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0
£
A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1
¤ª
<
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª
holds for any i. Then it must be true that,
nX
i=1
ti1X
t=t0
©
βt−t0
£
A (t0 − a1) θeP it (F,D)− 1
¤ª
pi
<
nX
i=1
ti2X
t=t0
©
βt−t0 · £A (t0 − a2) θeP it (F,D)− 1¤ª pi
or
V (θe, a1;F,D) < V (θ
e, a2;F,D) .
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Step 2: to prove V (θ
e,a;F,D)
∂θe > 0.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of V (θ
e,a;F,D)
∂a
> 0.
Step 3: to prove the existence of cut-oﬀ age a (θe;F,D) and a (θe0;F,D) ≥
a (θe;F,D), for θe0 > θe.
Proof. The existence of a (θe;F,D) is straightforward. Holding θe constant, V (θe, a;F,D)
is monotonically decreasing in a, then there must be a (θe;F,D) such that
V (θe, a (θe;F,D) ;F,D) > 0
but
V (θe, a (θe;F,D) + 1;F,D) ≤ 0.
And since V (θ
e,a;F,D)
∂θe > 0, I have:
V
³
θe
0
, a (θe;F,D) ;F,D
´
> V (θe, a (θe;F,D) ;F,D) = 0 holds for any θe0 > θe.
Therefore, it must be true that a (θe0;F,D) ≥ a (θe;F,D).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2 (three steps):
Proof. Step 1: to show that a steady state features time-invariant PtAt, such that
PtAt = PA, ∀ t, where Pt represents the equilibrium price and At represents the
leading technology in period t.
The condition of competitive pricing tells that:
Dt = Pt ·Qt.
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Qt is the aggregate output over heterogeneous firms.
Qt =
X
a
X
θe
Atθ
eft (θ
e, a) (1 + γ)−a.
so that:
Dt = PtAt ·
X
a
X
θe
θeft (θ
e, a) (1 + γ)−a. (1)
By definition, a steady state features constant level of demand, Dt = D (∀ t). and
time-invariant firm distribution. Let f (θe, a) denote the number of firms with (θe, a)
and ag , au denote the maximum ages for good firms and unsure firms in operation,
respectively. The above equation can be rewritten as:
D = PtAt ·
½
auP
a=0
£
θuf (θu, a) (1 + γ)
−a¤+ agP
a=1
£
θgf (θg, a) (1 + γ)
−a¤¾
so that
PtAt =
D½
auP
a=0
[θuf (θu, a) (1 + γ)−a] +
agP
a=1
[θgf (θg, a) (1 + γ)−a]
¾ .
Hence, PtAt must be time-invariant. I let PtAt = PA.
Step 2: solve for ag − au by firms’ exit conditions.
At a steady state, the aggregate state {D,F} is perceived to be time-invariant.
Thus, good firms know they will live until ag, and unsure firms know they will live
until au. The time-invariant decision rules at the steady state imply time-invariant
value functions. Let V (θe, a) represent the steady-state expected value of staying of
a firm with belief θe and age a.
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Since ag denote the maximum age of good firms in operation, and V (θg, a) de-
creases in a monotonically, the condition of firm rationality suggests it must be true
for ag that:
V (θg, ag) = 0
θgPA (1 + γ)
−ag − 1 = 0
so that
PA =
(1 + γ)ag
θg
. (2)
Similarly, exit condition for unsure firms suggest:
V (θu, au) = 0
θuPA (1 + γ)
−au − 1 + βpϕV (θg, au + 1) = 0
θuPA (1 + γ)
−au − 1 + βpϕ
agX
a=au+1
βa−au−1
£
θgPA (1 + γ)
−a − 1
¤
= 0
With (15) plugged in, I have (8):
µ
θu
θg
+
pϕβ
1 + γ − β
¶
(1 + γ)ag−au = 1 +
pϕβ
1− β −
pϕβγ
(1− β) (1 + γ − β)β
ag−au (8)
which can be re-written as:
F (ag − au) = G (ag − au)
Proposition 1 suggests that ag − au ≥ 0. To establish the existence of ag − au ≥ 0
that satisfies the above equation, I need to show that F and G cross each other at a
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positive value of ag − au.
G0 = − pϕβγ
(1− β) (1 + γ − β)β
ag−au lnβ > 0, but
G00 = − pϕβγ
(1− β) (1 + γ − β)β
ag−au (lnβ)2 < 0
moreover,
F (0) =
θu
θg
+
pϕβ
1 + γ − β , and
G (0) = 1 +
pϕβ
1 + γ − β .
and:
F (0) < G (0)
because θu
θg
< 1 by definition (θu = ϕθg + (1− ϕ) θb and θg > θb). F (0) < G (0)
suggests that the curve of F starts at ag − au = 0 below the curve of G. F 0 > 0
and G0 > 0 imply that both of F and G increase monotonically in ag − au. F 00 > 0
suggests that F is convex but G00 < 0 suggests that G is concave. Hence, F and G
must cross once at a positive value of ag − au, as shown in the following figure:
a ag u−0
( )F a ag u−
( )G a ag u−
( )F 0
( )G 0
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Therefore, (8) alone determines a unique value for ag − au.
Step 3, solve for f (0) and ag by combining the free entry condition and the com-
petitive pricing condition:
V (θu, 0) = C (f (0))
where f (0) represents the size of the entering cohort. With time-invariant life-cycle
dynamics for each cohort shown in Figure 2, I have:
V (θu, 0) =
auX
a=1
βa
·
PAθu
(1 + γ)a
− 1
¸
λ (θu, a) +
agX
a=1
βa
·
PAθg
(1 + γ)a
− 1
¸
λ (θg, a)
where λ (θu, a) denotes the probability of staying in operation at age a as an unsure
firm, and π (θg, a) denotes the probability of staying in operation at age a as a good
firm. All-or-nothing learning suggests that:
λ (θu, a) = (1− p)a for 0 ≤ a ≤ au,
λ (θg, a) = ϕ [1− (1− p)a] for 0 ≤ a ≤ au,
λ (θg, a) = ϕ
h
1− (1− p)au+1
i
for au + 1 ≤ a ≤ ag
Plugging λ (θu, a), λ (θg, a) and PA =
(1+γ)ag
θg
into V (θu, 0), I have:
(1 + γ)ag
θg



auP
a=1
βa


(1− p)a
³
θu
(1+γ)a − 1
´
+
ϕ (1− (1− p)a)
³
θg
(1+γ)a − 1
´

+
ϕ
³
1− (1− p)au+1
´ agP
a=au+1
βa
³
θg
(1+γ)a − 1
´
+
θu − 1



= C (f (0)) (3)
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Plugging PA = (1+γ)
ag
θg
back into (14) and applying the steady state industry
structure suggested by all-or-nothing learning and exit ages, I have:
f(0) · (1 + γ)
ag
θg


(θu − ϕθg)
auP
a=1
³
1−p
1+γ
´a
+ ϕθg
agP
a=1
³
1
1+γ
´a
+
ϕθg (1− p)
au+1
agP
a=au+1
³
1
1+γ
´a

 = D (4)
ag − au has been given by (8). The left-hand sides of (16) and (17) are both
monotonically increasing in ag; The left-hand side and the right-hand side of (16) are
both monotonically increasing in f (0). Hence, with au replaced by ag − (ag − au),
(16) and (17) jointly determine ag and f (0).
Therefore, for anyD, there exists a steady state that can be captured by {f (0) , ag, au}.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3:
Proof. To prove that d(ag)
dD
≥ 0 and d(au)
dD
≥ 0 at the steady state, combining (16 )
with (17) and replacing au by ag − (ag − au) gives the following:
(1 + γ)ag
θg


(θu − ϕθg)
auP
a=1
³
1−p
1+γ
´a
+ ϕθg
agP
a=1
³
1
1+γ
´a
+
ϕθg (1− p)
au+1
agP
a=au+1
³
1
1+γ
´a

 ·
c−1


(1 + γ)ag
θg



auP
a=1
βa


(1− p)a
³
θu
(1+γ)a − 1
´
+
ϕ (1− (1− p)a)
³
θg
(1+γ)a − 1
´

+
ϕ
³
1− (1− p)au+1
´ agP
a=au+1
βa
³
θg
(1+γ)a − 1
´
+
θu − 1





= D
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The left-hand is monotonically increasing in ag. Hence,
d(ag)
dD
≥ 0. With ag − au
independent of D as suggested by (8), d(au)
dD
= d(ag−(ag−au))
dD
≥ 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4:
Proof. Since rg = 1− (1−ϕ)pϕau
1−(1−p)au
+(1−ϕ)+pϕ(ag−au)
and ag − au is independent of D,
d (rg)
d (D)
=
d (rg)
d (au)
· d (au)
d (D)
Proposition 2 has established that d(au)
d(D)
≥ 0. Therefore, d(rg)
d(D)
≥ 0 if and only if
d(rg)
d(au)
≥ 0.
With au
1−(1−p)au = x,
d(rg)
d(au)
= d(rg)
d(x)
· d(x)
d(au)
. Since d(rg)
d(x)
> 0, d(rg)
d(au)
≥ 0 if and only if
d(x)
d(au)
≥ 0.
Hence, I need to prove that d(x)
d(au)
≥ 0.
1− (1− p)au is plotted in the following graph as a function of au. Since
d
³
1− (1− p)au
´
d (au)
= − (1− p)au · ln (1− p) > 0
but
d2
³
1− (1− p)au
´
d (au)
2 = − (1− p)
au · (ln (1− p))2 < 0,
the curve is concave.
au
1 1− −( )p au
θ
au
1 1− −( )p au
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Clearly, it indicates that x = au
1−(1−p)au = cot (θ) .The concavity of the curve
suggests that as au increases, the angle of θ shrinks and cot (θ) increases. Therefore,
x increases in au.
Results from two-moment Krusell-Smith approach:
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Ω {X,σa}
HΩ
booms ( logX):
logX 0 = 0.1261 + 0.9653 logX + 0.3246σa
recessions( logX):
σ0a = 0.0079 + 0.0076 logX + 0.8988σa
booms (σa):
logX 0 = −0.1485 + 0.9291 logX + 1.0317σa
recessions(σa):
σ0a = 0.0789 + 0.0166 logX + 0.6924σa
R2
booms ( logX): 0.9940
recessions( logX): 0.9287
booms (σa): 0.9571
recessions(σa): 0.5812
standard forecast
error
booms ( logX): 0.0000069741%
recessions( logX): 0.000068307%
booms (σa): 0.00012513%
recessions(σa):0.00097406%
maximum forecast
error
booms ( logX): 0.000087730%
recessions( logX):0.0016626%
booms (σa):0.0014396%
recessions(σa):0.028074%
Den Haan &
Marcet test statis-
tic (χ27)
0.9216
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